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ABSTRACT 
Distributed Generation: 
Issues Concerning a Changing Power Grid Paradigm 
Scott G. M. Therien 
 
 Distributed generation is becoming increasingly prevalent on power grids 
around the world.  Conventional designs and grid operations are not always 
sufficient for handling the implementation of distributed generation units; the new 
generation may result in undesirable operating conditions, or system failure.  This 
paper investigates the primary issues involved with the implementation of 
distributed generation and maintaining the integrity of the power grid.  The issues 
addressed include power flow, system protections, voltage regulation, 
intermittency, harmonics, and islanding.  A case study is also presented to 
illustrate how these issues can be addressed when designing distributed 
generation installation on an existent distribution system.  The case study design 
is performed on the campus distribution system of California Polytechnic State 
University, San Luis Obispo, with the design goal of implementing renewable 
energy sources to make the campus a net zero energy consumer. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 At increasing rates, various influences within the energy market are posing new 
challenges to traditional methods of delivering electrical energy.  In today’s energy 
market, it has become far more economically sound for many homeowners, business-
owners, and even grid operators to produce their own energy with small generators than 
it has previously been [1].  The reasons for this are numerous and debatable but include 
such motivations as environmental concerns, increases in cost to traditional energy 
sources, reductions in cost to new technologies, political incentives, and many other 
factors.  While there have been utility customers producing their own energy for a very 
long time, the increasing quantity and changes in methodologies of this production pose 
many new challenges. 
The standard power grid infrastructure has generally been comprised of large-
scale power plants feeding a high voltage network, from which substations drop the 
voltage and feed distribution networks at lower voltages.  With this paradigm, generation 
has been connected almost exclusively to the high voltage network while the distribution 
networks have fed almost exclusively to loads.  Therefore, the supportive and protective 
equipment used to maintain the power grid has often been implemented under 
assumptions dependent on the framework of this model.  Unfortunately, modern 
developments are making these assumptions more and more invalid. 
Small-scale generation units connected at the distribution level are commonly 
referred to as distributed generation.  Technically, most power grids have had some form 
of distributed generation (DG) for a long time – commonly in the form of peakers or 
stand-by generators.  However, modern day application of newer DG technologies 
presents situations of a different nature; in today’s energy market, DG is owned and 
operated privately and not for the intent of supporting overall grid operation.  
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Furthermore, the rising quantity of DG present on the grid, as well as the various types 
of generation used, presents new issues of concern.  The amount of DG units 
connecting to distribution grids is expected to continue increasing as new technologies 
and new applications develop; the power grids of the future may operate very differently 
than traditional grids [2, 3, 4].  Yet for the implementation of DG to be successful on 
existent grids, previously unaddressed scenarios must be investigated.  The high voltage 
network of a power grid has always accommodated many generation plants and was 
thusly built to do exactly that.  The same cannot be said of most distribution networks.  
Typical distribution lines are fed radially from substations under the assumption that 
power will flow strictly from the substation to the various loads downstream on that line.  
Distribution grids were simply not built to accommodate generation, as will be discussed 
at length throughout this paper.  True as this may be, most distribution areas can handle 
some amount of DG with little concern, some can handle very large amounts with only 
minor upgrades needed, and some stand to benefit greatly from the installation of DG 
units. 
In any case, many issues will need to be addressed if safe, reliable service of 
electric grids is to be maintained with increasing levels of DG interconnections.  These 
issues may include reforms in tariffs, insurance, regulation, and operating standards 
along with the many technical issues.  The purpose of this paper is to identify the 
technical issues encountered in DG interconnection scenarios – both problematic issues 
that must be overcome, as well as potential benefits that must be optimized.  The 
ultimate objective is to identify the scenarios where DG poses challenges and where DG 
benefits are highest and most applicable so that the proliferation of DG can be directed 
in the most cost-effective and universally advantageous ways.  Standards for DG 
interconnection are currently being written and revised by electric standard organizations 
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and committees around the world.  The issues presented in this paper are those that 
demand investigation in order for such standards to be effective. 
Section I of this paper addresses the definition of DG, which is foggy at best, and 
also present the motivations, uses, and types of DG that have begun to alter the 
paradigm of the electric grid.  Section II provides background on distribution system 
designs, which must be understood when investigating the effects of DG.  Sections III 
through VIII address the primary challenges encountered in DG interconnection.  Each 
of these sections easily warrants a full thesis on the individual issue addressed.  
However, the intent here is to provide a high level view of each topic and identify the 
specific circumstances that the design of DG interconnection must be engineered to 
meet.  Upon full identification of the issues at hand, Section IX presents a case study on 
a large distribution system that is existent and in service on the campus of California 
Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo (Cal Poly).  This campus purchases 
large quantities of electrical energy from the local utility Pacific Gas and Electric.  Under 
current energy market situations, it is widely agreed that the university stands to find 
great financial benefit from the proper implementation of DG on their distribution system.  
The objective of the case study is find optimal methods of DG interconnection that can 
provide an alternative to the import of energy to the campus, while designing to meet all 
challenges presented in the other sections.  It is the author’s intent to find a system 
design that provides the university a source of energy independence while causing no 
strain to the upstream grid of the utility, but rather offering beneficial support to the grid. 
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I.  DISTRIBUTED GENERATION: IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION 
 The term distributed generation (DG) is generally ill-defined.  At its loosest 
definition, it refers simply to generation of a small scale (when compared to large power 
plants).  The International Conference on Electricity Distribution (CIRED) posed the 
question to all member countries in 1997 as to how they defined distributed generation.  
There was no consensus.  Today, the definition is still muddled.  The criteria most 
commonly used to determine what generation should fall under the classification of DG 
are size, location, voltage level, type, and use/application. 
 
Size   
Those who qualify DG by size – in part, or in whole – typically set a cut-off of 
about 50MW-100MW as the maximum size of generation that could qualify as DG. 
 
Location 
The location of generation is used as a criterion because DG is often considered 
to be that generation that is used directly by end-users without transmission being 
necessary.  Therefore, the proximity of the generation to the loads it supplies is 
sometimes used to classify DG. 
 
Voltage Level 
Voltage level is also used to define DG, where generation at or below the 
maximum distribution level voltage is typically the maximum voltage level of DG.  This is 
a particularly poor classifier since there is often overlap between transmission voltage 
levels and distribution voltage levels.  Furthermore, various countries use significantly 
different levels of voltage for distribution purposes. 
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Type of Generator 
The type of generation, or the fuel source, is sometimes used to define DG, but 
this is usually done in a case where DG is meant to refer more specifically to 
renewable/alternative sources of generation. 
 
Use / Application 
The intended use or application is used to identify DG because it is often 
implemented directly at the load for direct consumption.  This differs from the location 
criterion because the question can be raised as to whether or not a generator located 
directly adjacent to a load qualifies as DG when it is owned and operated by the utility for 
grid support.  It should be mentioned that in some cases, energy storage units are 
considered DG.  This could include capacitors and batteries, which are not actually 
generators. 
 
 Due to the lack of an established catholic definition, most studies, regulations, or 
organizations concerned with DG will formulate their own working definition at onset.  
For example, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) define DG as 
“the generation of electricity by facilities that are sufficiently smaller than central 
generating plants so as to allow interconnection at nearly any point in a power system” 
[1].  For the purpose of evaluation, the definition of DG in [4] is given as “a small source 
of electric power generation or storage (typically ranging from less than a kW to tens of 
MW) that is not part of a large central power source and is located close to the load.”  A 
plethora of definitions can be found worldwide, but they tend to all be relatively similar, 
only differing in the specifics of the details.  In the interest of broad application, the 
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definition of DG taken in this paper is intentionally loose.  To the extent of the purposes 
of this paper, DG will be taken to refer to “any type of generation that is connected to a 
distribution power system which does not exceed 50MW of peak power production 
capabilities”. 
 Defining what constitutes a DG unit and identifying its impact on the grid, 
however, falls short of quantifying the overall effects from DG.  Penetration levels also 
must be considered when investigating the effects a grid will be subject to.  The 
penetration level of DG refers to the total quantity of DG found within a given region of 
the grid.  One may refer to the total DG penetration level seen on the entire grid, the 
level seen on one distribution system, or the level of penetration of one particular type of 
DG.  For example, if a residential homeowner on a typical distribution grid decided to 
install a 10kW photovoltaic system on the roof of his/her home, that alone would not 
likely have any significant effect on grid operation.  However, if every homeowner in that 
neighbor were to install similar systems, there would be a very high penetration level of 
DG on the distribution system of that neighborhood, and effects on grid operation could 
be drastic. 
 
Motivations for Distributed Generation 
 Over the last few decades, implementations of DG on grids around the world 
have been steadily increasing.  The most commonly cited reason for this – or at least the 
most fundamental – is the deregulation and liberalization of energy markets.  There is 
much disagreement as to the implications of a decentralized electricity infrastructure, but 
the fact remains that there is movement in this direction.  Under the old, highly regulated 
situation, public utilities held full control and responsibility for their power grid system 
from the generation to transmission, distribution, and delivery of energy.  This provided 
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an economy of scale for which large centralized power plants provided the best option.  
Initially following the deregulation of energy markets, new energy suppliers and newly 
privatized utilities still found large power plants to be most cost effective for their means.  
Nothing changed from the perspective of power engineering, only from the perspective 
of ownership and cash flow.  Yet since then, there have been emerging technologies 
and opportunities that challenge the traditional paradigm of the power grid. 
 The rise of DG is shifting the grid paradigm away from the traditional centralized 
systems that have long been the basis for grid operation.  Motivations that have 
contributed to this case include economic opportunities of liberalized energy markets, 
increased demands for highly reliable energy supply, environmental concerns of 
generation methods, and increasing cost-effectiveness of emerging technologies.  The 
volatile nature of energy costs, coupled with the opportunities for private energy 
production in a liberalized market, has driven the search for new methods of power 
generation by a greatly increased number of interested parties.  The various applications 
of DG that have drawn new players into the field of electricity generation are covered in 
greater detail in the following section on DG uses.  Suffice to say that the developments 
in DG technologies have provided alternatives to traditional means of obtaining and 
supplying energy, which many have found to be beneficial and cost-effective.  Fuel 
sources for the production of electricity have expanded beyond coal, natural gas, 
nuclear, and hydro to now include wind, hydrogen, solar irradiation, algaes, and even 
waste matter.  Efficient use of new fuel sources can be very attractive in markets where 
the price of traditional fuel sources can be unpredictable or expensive. 
 Not all DG motivation is found by customers and energy producers alone; public 
and private utilities find benefits in DG applications as well.  The maintenance of 
transmission and distribution (T&D) systems is a difficult and costly task for utilities; 
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upgrades are constantly necessary to keep up with energy consumption growth while, 
particularly in the United States, much antiquated equipment on the old grids is in dire 
need of replacement.  DG can offer deferment of these costs in some cases.  By 
implementing DG at the distribution level where there is significant growth, otherwise 
needed upgrades of the equipment upstream can be avoided while the energy losses 
associated with T&D can be reduced.  Of the end-user price that customers pay for 
electricity in the United States, it’s been found that approximately 30% of those costs are 
attributed to T&D costs [1, 5].  These costs can potentially be decreased or eliminated by 
on-site energy production of DG.  Utilities may also be able to defer other system costs 
by using DG for other needed services such as voltage support or reactive power 
production, power factor control, harmonic filtering, and load demand following when 
remote DG control is possible [2]. 
 Furthermore, demands for higher reliability of electric supply are constantly 
increasing, especially for industry applications such as chemicals, petroleum, refining, 
paper, metals, telecommunications, and the like [1].  This has created an incentive for 
customers to invest in DG for the purpose of increasing overall reliability, as well as for 
utilities to do the same.  The term reliability refers to the likelihood of a power outage for 
any reason such as equipment failure, maintenance, or other abnormal conditions.  The 
empirical study of DG motivators presented in [6] found that privately owned utilities 
typically have lower reliability rates while their T&D costs tend to be significantly higher 
when compared to public utilities.  For this reason, DG may be more desirable on grids 
operated by private utilities.  The study of [6] also demonstrated that customers of 
private utilities are more likely to own and operate DG than those of any other ownership 
type utility.   
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 Environmental concerns have led to the development of policies that encourage 
the implementation of DG, albeit sometimes indirectly.  Many utilities now face 
renewable portfolio standards (RPS) which mandate that a certain percentage of the 
energy they supply be generated from renewable processes.  Most renewable energy 
sources lend themselves, by nature, to DG rather than centralized plant applications.  It 
has been found that utilities with RPS mandates are more likely to accept or support the 
installation of DG at customer sites when it can be credited to their renewable portfolio 
[6].  With customers and utilities both finding incentives for the use of DG, the difficulties 
faced with realizing effective and efficient implementation are more readily overcome. 
 
Hindrances to the Applications of Distributed Generation 
 As mentioned, traditional power grids were not built to accommodate generation 
at the distribution level.  While transmission systems are designed and equipped to 
handle large amounts of scattered generation and bidirectional power flows, distribution 
systems have typically been built under assumptions that they would be used solely to 
distribute power from the transmission system to loads downstream.  Hence, the issues 
involved with DG are still largely uncharted territory compared to the tried-and-true 
methods developed for the traditional system paradigm.  There is an extreme lack of 
standards regarding the implementation of DG – specifically with regard to 
interconnection methods and schemes, tariff payment schemes, power quality 
characteristics, and insurance policies [6].  Regulations for DG implementation are 
governed country-by-country in Europe and state-by-state in the US, while in some 
cases a complete lack of regulation leaves individual utilities to determine their own 
standards [2].  The lack of standards from international committees and organizations is 
by no means due to apathy; persistent research has been on-going throughout.  The fact 
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that DG presents itself in a multitude of sizes and types along with the fact that 
distribution systems are found in an even greater multitude of design structures, make 
universal standardization of interconnection nearly impossible.  Nonetheless, attempts 
are underway to provide technical standards that will guide the methods of implementing 
DG on power grids. 
 The lack of standards can be a sincere impediment to proliferation of DG 
applications.  This situation often forces would-be DG operators and utilities to conduct 
surveys and investigations of their own to determine the proper means of installing DG.  
The results of such studies may then need approval from the respective regulatory 
bodies, which can take considerable time without governing standards.  Another result is 
that manufacturers of equipment used for interconnection must provide equipment for a 
variety of system requirements.  This prevents the manufacturer from being able to 
standardize their products, which would otherwise enable them to reduce production 
costs, thereby reducing integration costs.  The eventual ratification of standards being 
developed may greatly increase the cost-effectiveness of DG opportunities.  [2] 
 While the structure of today’s energy markets was cited as a motivation for DG in 
the previous section, it still has aspects to it that strongly deter DG developments.  
Distribution operators basically make their profit from the energy that flows across their 
lines, so the installation of customer-owned DG that would reduce the amount of energy 
(kWh) flowing on those lines is contradictory to their objectives – fundamentally at least 
[5].  Motivations contrary to this can often outweigh this hindrance, but tariff reforms are 
likely to be necessary in order for distribution operators to justify full support of DG 
proliferation.  Furthermore, the customers are typically charged by the kWh delivered to 
their meters with T&D costs incorporated into the cost per kWh, which can make up 30% 
of their charges as mentioned previously.  DG owners, however, may normally consume 
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little or no energy from the utility despite the fact that the grid is there to support and 
back-up their own generation.  In this case, customers without DG are, in a sense, 
subsidizing those customers who do own DG.  Market studies are also being researched 
to these ends, and tariff reform and market restructuring may be necessary in order for 
DG to be used in a manner that does not adversely affect energy markets.  [2] 
 Despite the ease or difficulties afforded to DG development by market forces, 
there are many technical issues that must be addressed for successful integration.  This 
paper is intended to identify and address each of these issues in detail.  The primary 
issues that pose challenges in DG-grid interconnection can be summarized as: power 
flow reversal, protection scheme disturbance, voltage regulation, intermittency, 
harmonics, and islanding.  The issue of islanding tends to be of particular concern to 
interested parties, as it may be the issue most likely to cause extreme system damages.  
Each of the technical issues mentioned are addressed individually in the following 
sections of this paper.  While all of these issues must be addressed to avoid undesirable 
operation, some of them also are found to offer potential benefits to overall system 
performance. 
 
Uses & Types of Distributed Generation 
 The types of technology used to implement DG are constantly developing and 
increasing; this is likely due to the rising costs of conventional energy sources and the 
decreasing costs of newly developed generation methods.  Some types of DG are well 
established; reciprocating engines have been used for decades as DG and are well 
established as the most commonly used type today.  Alternatives to the reciprocating 
engine, such as gas turbines and microturbines, have been developed for similar 
(though perhaps different scale) applications, but may provide reduced emissions and 
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longer lifetimes or reduced maintenance costs.  These types of DG are commonly used 
for combined heat and power (CHP) systems, where the waste heat of electric 
generation is used for on-site heat applications.  CHP systems have been found to 
provide very cost-effective applications to large industrial sites where high quantities of 
heat and power would otherwise need to be purchased individually.  Sterling engines 
have more recently found viability in small scale CHP generation application including 
household appliances sold in Europe.  The fuel sources of such generation systems can 
vary from natural gas to biomass to solar concentration.  [7] 
 Environmental concerns and governmental mandates have helped to bring about 
a growing use of renewable sources of energy production.  Hydroelectric power has, of 
course, been established long before these more recent renewable incentives, but small-
scale hydro has subsequently become a more enticing option as it qualifies under some 
mandates and subsidies while providing a well understood and highly developed 
generation method. 
 Newer technologies on this front include photovoltaics (PV), solar concentrators, 
wind turbines, and fuel cells.  Photovoltaics have recently developed to the point where 
manufacturing processes and efficiencies have been refined enough for the systems to 
be financially viable to even the modest home-owner.  Solar concentration is an even 
newer development with fewer completed implementations to evaluate.  However, these 
systems hold strong promises of successful application as the fuel source used is the 
freely available and endless energy of solar insolation, but furthermore because it offers 
potential for energy storage.  While PV systems only produce energy while under direct 
solar irradiation unless the system includes batteries or other storage techniques, solar 
concentration systems used a more novel technique.  The concentrators can be used to 
“super-heat” a large quantity of fluid, which can be stored in a thermal reservoir and 
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subsequently used to generate a consistent output of energy from turbines.  The benefit 
of inherent storage ability and constant energy output makes this renewable source 
highly advantageous and even offers potential application for large scale centralized 
plants. 
 Wind turbines have been successfully implemented in very small scale 
applications such as a single turbine used to power farm equipment.  However, it also 
has been implemented on very large scales; Denmark has successfully installed very 
high penetrations of wind farms, producing more than 20% of the countries electric 
energy from wind.  Some large wind farms function as high voltage power plants, but 
they are more commonly used as DG. 
 Fuel cells are another very recent development in generation technology, which 
use hydrogen and oxygen to produce electricity through chemical reactions.  There are 
many types of fuels differing most significantly in the electrolyte employed and the 
method of hydrogen acquisition.  Most fuel cell technology is not yet available 
commercially, but some forms are currently in use.  While costs of this young technology 
remain very high, motivations for its development include high efficiency and reliability, 
fuel sources of high abundance, and the lack of combustion needed which offers low 
noise and near zero harmful emissions.  [5, 7] 
 The types of generators used for DG are currently numerous, and likely to 
become even more numerous and diverse.  However, for the perspective of power 
system engineering, the raw source of energy is nearly irrelevant.  The concern lies 
almost exclusively in the characteristics of the voltage and current waveforms produced 
at the point of interconnection, the protection schemes implemented, and the response 
to system abnormalities.  These characteristics are what shall shape the requirements of 
DG installation to grids, and the generator systems will each employ their own methods 
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of accomplishing the production of viable power supply.  Inverter technology has 
produced highly developed equipment that now provides strong control of various 
generation systems to make them viable for grid interconnection. 
 The applications of these various generation sources are as wide and diverse as 
the types of generation.  As mentioned, CHP systems are one of the most significantly 
cost-effective motivations that justify DG projects.  However, decreasing manufacturing 
costs and government subsidies have increased the application of PV systems for roof-
top installations on homes and businesses.  Utilities find applications for DG as a 
method of voltage support, power factor correction, line loss reduction, and alternatives 
to more costly methods of system upgrades and extensions.  Customers and utilities 
alike have used DG to increase reliability with standby/emergency generation systems, 
avoid high energy costs with peak shaving DG that reduces the consumption of 
expensive peak demand energy, and even provide primary power supply in cost-
effective manners.  Application for DG promises to increase and broaden as 
technologies in generation continue developing and challenges of interconnection are 
addressed and overcome.  The structure of electric power grid systems is likely to take 
on a whole new form over the years to come.  With the proper engineering, future power 
grids may provide higher reliability, stronger power quality characteristics, lower energy 
costs, and less detrimental impacts on the environment. 
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II.  RADIAL DISTRIBUTION VERSUS NETWORKED DISTRIBUTION 
  Most power grids are not built of repeating sections of identical systems.  While 
there are standards set forth by organizations like IEEE, ANSI, and IEC that help 
maintain consistency, nearly every section of any power grid can be viewed as unique.  
The huge variations in distribution system designs tend to make it particularly difficult to 
standardize DG installations; every distribution system will have its own requirements 
and limitations based on its own unique design.  Despite their differences, most grids are 
commonly identified under two primary styles: North American or European.  Other 
geographical regions may have a mixture of the two styles, but tend to more-or-less 
follow the style of the nation that had more influence over their electrical developments.  
The differences in these styles are primarily inconsequential for the purpose of this 
paper.  Regardless of the over-arching style of the grid network, distribution systems 
throughout the world are accomplished primarily in a radial fashion [8].  A radial 
distribution system will feed loads from a single point of source supply, which greatly 
simplifies the task of protecting the system.  Under radial distribution, power flow is 
typically unidirectional so more simplistic protection devices are adequate. 
  Figure II.1 shows a general radial distribution system.  The system illustrated 
has two feeders that are each protected by a circuit breaker at the substation.  Each 
feeder supplies multiple loads downstream and contains additional protective devices 
such as reclosers, fuses, and breakers.  There is also an intertie switch that is normally 
open (N.O.), which connects the ends of the two feeders together; this switch is not 
always implemented for radial distribution.  Under normal operation, such a switch would 
be open and the system would be fed radially.  The switch may be closed by grid 
operators for short periods, during which time the system is said to be functioning in a 
looped fashion.  This may be done in order to allow maintenance, or for other temporary 
abnormal operation.  For instance, if a fault 
occurred at Load 3 and the fuse immediately 
upstream would trip and the fault would be 
isolated.  The faulted feeder could also be 
subsequently isolated by the breakers 
immediately upstream and downstream of 
the Load 3 fuse.  While maintenance was 
performed on Load 3, Load 1 could be fed 
through CB1, and the switch could be closed 
to feed Load 5 under looped operation. 
 
 
As opposed to radial distribution, 
w voltage networked distribution 
Figure II.1  General Radial Distribution System
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(sometimes called meshed distribution) 
may be employed in areas where higher 
levels of service reliability are needed.  
Systems of this design type are common 
in large commercial metropolitan areas 
where there is a dense collection of 
customer loads that demand robust 
reliability rates.  The downtown financial 
district of San Francisco, CA is an 
example of one of the most 
ure II.2  General Low Voltage Network Distribution
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s, 
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complex and expensive networked distribution systems, serviced by Pacific Gas & 
Electric.  Figure II.2 shows a more generic example of a low voltage network distribution
system.  Multiple feeders from the substation will feed a low voltage bus (typically at 
208/120V or 480/277V), and this bus will feed multiple network loads.  The system is 
design so that in the occurrence of one of the feeders failing, service to the loads is 
undisrupted.  Protection schemes on networked distribution systems are more 
complicated because power flow can be bi-directional.  If there is a fault on one of the
feeders, that fault will be fed from both the main substation bus and the low voltage bu
requiring the feeder to be disconnected at both ends.  Yet since faults at the low voltage 
bus may also occur, the network protectors must be coordinated to trip for fault c
in both directions.  Furthermore, coordination must avoid redundant or nuisance tripping,
since many devices may see significant current increases for faults outside their 
protection zones. 
 The installation of significant degrees of DG capacity on networked distribution 
systems is rarely attempted because the costs associated with overcoming the involved 
complications usually eliminates any potential of financial justification.  On low voltage 
networks, DG penetration is generally limited to 15% of the minimum network load; 
higher penetrations could demand extensive changes to the existing system [8].  Some 
networks feed customers with a very high load demand (e.g. large commercial buildings) 
for whom DG appeals to as a means of lower energy costs.  This is not usually a 
problem if the generation is used on site as opposed to being exported to the network.  It 
is net-generation sites that are most problematic for low voltage networks because the 
network bus would then be back-fed by the DG, but these networks are typically found in 
densely populated metropolitan areas where space for generation would be very limited. 
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 This paper focuses on radial distribution systems because they are much more 
prevalent in general, and because they tend to be much more likely sites for significant 
DG penetration.  While radial distribution systems are used to illustrate the issues 
addressed, most of these issues apply similarly to low voltage networks – though 
possibly in more complex ways.  It is worth mentioning, however, that operating radial 
systems in a looped fashion may have benefits when DG is connected.  For a DG unit at 
the end of a radial feeder, closing an intertie switch to another feeder can significantly 
reduce the need for complete disconnect during faults.  In the following sections, it will 
be illustrated that requirements for interconnection of DG to radial distribution feeders 
could require rather frequent disconnects.  Since the DG unit would be connected to two 
feeders during looped operation, the unit could remain connected to the grid when a fault 
on one feeder would otherwise require a complete disconnect.  For this reason, it has 
been suggested in [9] that distribution systems with high DG penetration could benefit 
from operating normally in the looped fashion. 
 
III.  POWER FLOW 
 The most readily apparent limitation when integrating new DG to a distribution 
system is likely to be one of overflow (current capacity limits).  For the most part, 
installing DG to a system should reduce power flow within transmission and distribution 
lines as it supplies power to local loads and reduces the amount of power required from 
a distant power plant, and thereby reduces line losses [10].  However, it is also possible 
that a DG could increase the power flow of a particular line.  For this case, current 
capacity limitations must be addressed [11].  If existent grid equipment is already seeing 
power flow nearing its duty ratings, a nearby DG unit might cause an overload.  
Similarly, the DG will increase many fault currents which may exceed levels acceptable 
for existent relays, and nuisance tripping may occur even under normal operating 
conditions; these issues will be discussed at length in the section on protection scheme 
disturbances. 
 To illustrate the issue of overflow, 
consider the system of Figure III.1 in which a 
substation feeds a distribution system 
composed of four radial feeders; the possibly 
various loads on each feeder are modeled 
here a one lumped at the end of the feeder 
(with a 90% power factor each).  Without the 
presence of DG anywhere on the system, 
Line 3 will have 14A/phase flowing through it 
to service Load 3.  Therefore, the line may be 
rated at 25A/phase so the line can service the 
load up to 150% loading without damage.  Figure III.1  Example Distribution System
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However, if a DG unit were to be connected to the system, such as the one shown on 
Line 3, power flows would be altered.  The DG shown here produces 1MW at a 90% 
power factor, which could be a single generator or could be the model for a combined 
capacity of multiple units connected along Line 3 at different points.  This DG unit would 
provide 70% of real power demand for the distribution system, alleviating demand from 
the grid.  However, the power fed to the loads on the other lines would amount to more 
than 31A flowing through Line 3 to Bus 2, causing an overload of the line.  The system 
could not handle this DG installation as illustrated unless Line 3 were upgraded or 
another line were added between the DG and Bus 2. 
 Also to be noted from the system illustrated, is that power flow is found flowing 
directly from the substation bus to the loads without DG presence.  Yet with DG 
installed, the additional power that could cause an overflow would be flowing in the 
opposite direction – from the DG unit to the substation bus.  Even if a smaller sized DG 
unit were installed so that no overflow occurred, there could still be power flow in the 
direction from the load to the substation bus. 
 Typical distribution systems primarily involve only unidirectional power flow at the 
distribution level [1, 10, 12] and control techniques are employed accordingly.  Power is 
generally assumed to flow from upstream (power plants; HV lines) to downstream 
(consumers; LV lines).  When DG is added to a distribution line, it can cause power flow 
reversal, meaning that power may then begin to flow upstream within a section of the 
system that has been engineered specifically for downstream flow.  Therefore, a power 
flow study  along with loading and generation profiles may be necessary, prior to the 
installation of new DG, to ensure that there is no reversal of power flow or, at least, that 
any potential reversal will not disturb grid operation.  Even if nominal operation does not 
cause problematic power flow reversal, extreme cases must be accounted for.  The 
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system may need to be able to handle a case when the DG has maximum output and 
local loads are at their minimum.  The degree of concern with this issue, of course, is 
very dependent on the specific DG design being employed.  Solar generation is often 
minimal at night when loads are also minimal, which inherent reduces the possibility of 
generation exceeding load demand during light loading condsitions.  Some DG 
operators may opt to employee dynamic control system to monitor the system and adjust 
output levels accordingly.  The issue of power flow reversal will be unique in each DG 
case; the issue must be addressed with regard to the specific generation unit being 
implemented as well as to the specifics of the distribution system it will interconnect with. 
  A practical design technique for evaluating a potential DG site then, is to begin 
first by identifying all duty ratings and current capacity limits of the grid equipment that 
will be affected.  These limitations will either reveal the limitation on maximum power 
output of the DG unit, or reveal the equipment that needs to be upgraded to 
accommodate the DG, or both.  Difficulty may lie in deciding just how far upstream and 
downstream one must investigate; a basic load flow analysis should give insight into 
which areas are pertinent, but contingency cases and other abnormal operating 
conditions may cause the DG presence to affect areas further than anticipated.  With 
common radially fed distribution systems, the feeder lines often have a single point of 
source supply coming from a substation transformer or bus.  System design may 
become complicated if there is the possibility of a power flow reversal that would cause 
an upstream flow to this source.  Therefore, a practical design (technically and 
economically) would require that the DG output power be limited to a quantity that does 
not cause an upstream flow (at least on the average) – that is, the DG unit supply should 
not exceed the local demand load.  Feeding power upstream from a radial distribution 
line to its supply source can cause issues not easily mitigated [13]. 
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IV.  PROTECTION SYSTEM DISTURBANCES 
 For the purpose of protecting expensive equipment and providing reliable power 
to customers, every power grid is outfitted with extensive protection systems.  System 
faults are common and unavoidable; the creative methods of protection are designed 
carefully to minimize the harm done by these faults.  The primary components of a 
protection system include fuses, circuit breakers, relays, reclosers, and sectionalizers.  
These devices are coordinated to ensure quick removal of faults with minimal service 
disconnection to customers.  In the case of distribution systems, most of this 
coordination is dependent on the assumed paradigm of downstream power flow from 
source to load.  Once again, the transformation of distribution lines from load feeders to 
load/source lines when DG is connected forces traditional design principles to be 
rethought and altered.  Protecting lines with bidirectional power flow is, by no means, a 
new engineering feat; high voltage transmission lines handle power flow in both 
directions connecting vast networks of generation sources.  However, it can be very 
expensive and complicated to upgrade a distribution system in order to accomplish the 
same task.  For starters, fuses are used extensively on distribution lines because they 
are effective and cheap; these are not ideal devices for bidirectional protection.  
Furthermore, the protective devices on distribution lines are usually coordinated in a 
fashion that is strictly dependent on unidirectional flow.  For example, reclosers are often 
employed upstream of fuses to clear temporary faults before the fuse is permanently 
damaged, but may not be able to do so if there is generation downstream (this situation 
is addressed in detail later).  These temporary faults comprise more than 70% of 
distribution system faults, and the methods used to remove these faults allow utility 
companies to maintain reliability while managing maintenance costs [14]. 
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  When selecting a site for DG installation, the ideal case would be that existent 
protection schemes would still function as designed or only need minor changes such as 
adjustments of relay settings.  However, more extensive changes are likely to be needed 
for significantly large DG units or even for higher penetration levels of smaller units.  
These changes can often be expensive enough to overshadow the benefit of DG 
installation.  Many distribution systems operate near maximum capacities during nominal 
power flow which means that the increase in fault currents due to DG would require the 
installation of new equipment even if coordination were not lost.  There are, therefore, 
areas of distribution grids on which DG is simply not economically feasible.  However, 
other areas may have significantly lower costs to protection system alteration where 
available capacities are greater.  Finding a site for DG that demands manageable levels 
of alteration to protection schemes can be critical in making the project economically 
feasible.  Careful study and simulation of the system in question should be performed 
beforehand; it has been found that most new DG sites will suffer unanticipated 
operational problems from failed protective coordination, which can prove a heavy 
burden for those charged with operation and maintenance duties. [8] 
 While some distribution lines in service show no practical hopes of handling 
significant levels of DG, there certainly are ways to provide system improvement with 
DG in other areas.  As mentioned, some existent distribution systems are currently 
capable of accepting significant DG and are being used to do so.  Furthermore, as new 
distribution grids are built, foresight can be used during design to provide margins of 
capacity increase that allow for future development of DG with minimal alterations 
needed.  It should also be noted that areas of distribution where equipment is running 
near maximum capacities are likely to be the areas that are soon to be due for standard 
maintenance upgrades.  These inevitable costs should be considered before 
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determining that the cost of upgrades required for DG are too great; it may be that they 
mitigate one another such that DG installation is more economically sensible. 
 The following three sections outline some fundamental problems that may be 
encountered when adding DG to existing distribution systems with particular protective 
devices.  The problems discussed here are not necessarily comprehensive, but illustrate 
the fundamental functionings that can be disturbed by DG.  All systems are unique and 
must be studied individually when significant changes are made.  The following issues 
provide somewhat of a starting point checklist for investigating how protective devices 
will be affected by the introduction of DG to a particular system. 
 
Fuses 
 Fuses are commonly used in distribution systems partly because they less costly 
that other protective devices (i.e. circuit breakers) and because they have more 
simplistic functioning.  Fuses are characterized by two main features: minimum melting 
(MM) time and total clearing (TC) time.  Both of these characteristics are with respect to 
the current passing through the fuse.  For a given current, the MM time is the duration of 
time the fuse can handle such current before it is damaged and has partially tripped.  
The TC time is the time it takes for the fuse to fully trip and clear a fault for a given 
current.  Fuses with different TC and MM characteristics are used throughout a 
distribution system in order to coordinate tripping.  See Figure IV.1 for an example of a 
radial distribution system that is protected by fuses.  Under normal operation (ignoring 
DG for now), each load is consuming about 23A.  Fuses 1, 3, and 4 will see this current, 
while Fuse 2 will see twice that.  It would be reasonable, then, for the fuses used here to 
be selected such that they will trip for currents above 50A and 100A (fault currents on 
this system are on the order of kA).  
  Figure IV.1  Radial Distribution System with Fuse Protection 
 
 Without DG, proper coordination would have Fuse 3 trip for a fault at D.  A trip of 
Fuse 2 would also remove the fault, but would unnecessarily disconnect loads at E.  To 
ensure that only Fuse 3 trips for a fault at D, the TC time of Fuse 3 must be less the MM 
time of Fuse 2 for the maximum fault current at D.  Figure IV.2 shows the characteristics 
for two fuses that may be used to accomplish this.  Note that for any given fault current 
at D, Fuse 3 will clear the 
fault before Fuse 2 is 
damaged if the current 
through Fuses 2 and 3 are 
approximately equal.  Pre-
fault currents are negligible 
compared to fault currents, 
so it is generally valid to 
Figure IV.2  Fuse 2 and 3 Characteristic Curves
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assume equal fault currents through Fuses 2 and 3 [15].  Similar fuse selection for Fuse 
4 also allows faults at E to be cleared without disconnecting loads at D.  
 Adding DG to this system can disturb the protection scheme in various ways 
since the fault currents will all be altered by the added generation.  Considering the 
addition of a 200kW DG unit at D in Figure IV.1, multiple coordination issues arise.  With 
the DG unit outputting 150kW, it will produce about 150A of additional fault current for 
faults on the system shown. 
 
Case 1a)  If a fault occurred at B, the 150A from the DG at D would flow through Fuses 
2 & 3 and they would trip.  Fuse 1 would trip as well because it would see this current 
plus the full fault current from the grid.  This means that faults at B would cause all loads 
to be disconnected.  Loads 3 & 4 could have remained in service by tripping only Fuse 1 
to clear the fault. 
 
Case 1b)  If a fault occurred at C, the 150A from the DG would flow through Fuse 3, 
causing it to trip.  Fuse 2 would also trip due to the full fault current from the grid.  The 
result is a disconnect of Loads 3 & 4, which is desired.  However, Fuse 3 would have to 
be replaced after this fault since it would have tripped unnecessarily. 
 In fact, a DG unit at D will cause Fuse 3 to trip for all faults upstream, as well as 
any other fuse between the DG and the fault.  It can be seen readily, that the same 
problem is encountered for DG at B or E.  The main issue here is actually a 
manifestation of the power flow reversal issue mentioned in the previous section. 
 
Case 1c)  Considering a slightly altered system shown in Figure IV.3, a different, though 
similar, problem is encountered.  Note that Load 3 in this system is only 200kVA, but the 
DG attached at D produces 750kW.  The DG is capable of providing all power needed 
for Loads 3 & 4, which would reduce capacity demands for the grid upstream of A and 
reduce (or eliminate) losses over the line connecting A and C.  However, under the 
assumption that Fuse 3 was sized for Load 3, it would be tripped under normal operation 
with DG at D.  Load 4 is more than twice that of Load 3, and Fuse 3 would see the full 
current of Load 4. 
Figure IV.3  Altered System with Fuse Protection 
 
 These cases may seem to present problems that are easily solved.  For 
example, Case 1c merely requires that Fuse 3 be resized, or to install DG at E instead of 
D.  However, the systems presented are intentionally simplistic in order to illustrate the 
potential problems clearly.  On larger, more realistic systems, these problems can be far 
more difficult to solve or even to identify.  An actually distribution system may have 
hundreds of coordinated protection devices that would be affected by DG. 
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Figure IV.4  Radial Distribution System with Relay Protection  
 
 When no DG is connected, the r
 
f DG 
bility of 
lays to properly detect faults.  The radial distribution feeder shown in Figure IV.4 can 
e used to illustrate the problems encountered by relays when DG is present (assume 
tandard overcurrent relays are used). 
elay R2 should trip for faults at Bus 3 but relay 
R1 should n
current for a p 
faster.  Rela s (CTS) and time 
dial settings r 
o R2 
in this case; 
 
Circuit Breakers & Relays 
 Circuit breakers are also commonly used to disconnect faults from the system.  
The breakers are usually tripped by means of relays that detect faults with current 
transformers (CTs) and voltage transformers (VTs).  As mentioned, the installation o
will change fault currents throughout the system, which will then affect the a
re
b
s
ot.  For faults at Bus 2, R1 would trip.  Both relays would see the same fault 
 fault at Bus 3, therefore the relays must be coordinated so that R2 will tri
y coordination is accomplished using the current tap setting
(TDS) of the relays.  In this case, the TDS of R1 would be set to a highe
value than R2 so that R2 would trip faster for faults at Bus 3.  R1 provides backup t
if R2 fails to operate quickly, R1 will still operate after a certain delay, 
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referred to as the coordination time interval of 
how these settings would appear for coordination in this case. 
s 
l 
e 
 can usually be resolved 
with simple setting changes, but these changes may affect a protection scheme’s ability 
t 
, by 
(CTI).  Figure IV.5 shows a typical graph 
Figure IV.5  Relay Coordination for System of Fig. IV.4 
 
Case 2a)  If DG is connected to the system, it will reduce the current seen by both relay
for faults at Bus 3.  This can cause an underreach of the relays, which means that the 
fault current through the CTs is no longer large enough to trip the relays under the intia
settings [16].  This does not pose a large problem, though, because it can likely be 
resolved by simply changing the CTS of each relay accordingly [14].  The TDS of th
initial case, or similar settings, should be sufficient to maintain coordination in this case 
for a basic radial feeder like that of Figure IV.4.  Underreaching
to handle other cases, so careful analysis and reevaluation is still needed. 
 
Case 2b)  If DG2 is connected to the system, then both relays will still see the same faul
current for faults at Bus 3.  With no DG, coordination is accomplished, as mentioned
setting the TDS of R1 to a higher value so that it will be delayed; R2 would trip and 
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s 1 & Bus 3; 
erefore, the standard TDS and CTS of these relays cannot be configured such that R1 
t 
rent levels 
re significant.  Figure IV.6a shows coordination of the relays for a fault on Bus 3.  Under 
d 
 
remove the fault before R1 trips.  Yet this solution presents a new problem when DG2 is
connected.  DG2 would feed fault current to a fault at Bus 1, so it would be desired that 
R1 trip.  Yet R2 would trip first if the TDS of R1 is at a larger value than R2.  Under this 
system configuration, R1 and R2 see the same current for faults at both Bu
th
trips first for Bus 1 faults and R2 trip first for Bus 3 faults.  This is an illustration of how 
existent coordination methods fail due to unexpected upstream power flows. 
 
Case 2c)  When DG1 and DG2 are both connected to the system, the variations in fault 
currents must be looked at carefully.  For a fault at Bus 3, R2 will see a larger current 
than R1 (additional DG1 contribution).  For a fault at Bus 1, R1 will see a larger current 
(upstream flow from 2 DGs).  R1 will also see a larger current (utility contribution) for 
faults at Bus 2, but both relays should trip for this case.  However, R2 should trip first for 
faults at Bus 3, and R1 should trip first for faults at Bus 1.  Since the relays see differen
fault currents for these cases, coordination is possible if the differences in cur
a
the same relay settings, Figure IV.6b illustrates the margin by which the fault currents 
must differ (minimal current difference shown) in order for coordination to be maintaine
for faults at Bus 1.  In order to decrease the margin necessary for coordination for Bus 1
faults (and further upstream faults), the CTI for Bus 3 faults must be decreased.  
Obviously, there is a limitation on how small the margin can be made (CTIs must be long 
enough to ensure proper functioning), and there must be significant difference in faults 
currents for this coordination to hold.  Furthermore, each graph shows only one fault 
current value for each relay, but the CTI and margin criterion show here must hold for all 
fault types. 
   Figure IV.6a  Coordination for Bus 3 Fault             Figure IV.b  Coordination for Bus 1 Fault
on existent relays will have associated costs.  The generation unit itself will require its 
ake 
 to 
 
 These three cases illustrate some of the various ways that relay coordination can 
be affected by the introduction of DG.  However, the system investigated here was a 
relatively simplistic model.  Every system is unique and, thusly, every protection scheme 
is unique.  To maintain or establish sound protection on a system where DG is 
introduced, the principles outlined here must be extrapolated to understand how to 
protect the system in question.  It must be kept in mind that redesigning protection 
schemes can add heavily to the initial costs of a DG project; even changing the settings 
own protection, but disturbances to existent relay coordination can pose an additional 
economic hurdle. 
 
Reclosers & Sectionalizers 
 The importance of reclosers was mentioned briefly at the beginning of this 
section; reclosers provide a method for quickly handling the temporary faults that m
up more than two-thirds of all system faults.  If a fuse or a circuit breaker is tripped to 
remove a fault, maintenance personnel are usually needed to come to the site in order
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 can trip only a limited number of times before they degrade, making 
ult management an expensive endeavor.  Reclosers act automatically and quickly to 
 would otherwise destroy protective devices far too rapidly.  
k 
ill 
16] 
 
n 
her 
.  
reestablish service.  Furthermore, fuses must be replaced after they have tripped, and 
circuit breaker also
fa
remove temporary faults that
These frequent temporary faults occur when an electric arc forms, creating a short 
circuit.  The basic idea behind the recloser is that a disconnect from the source feeding 
the short will de-ionize (extinguish) the arc quickly and the system can be brought bac
online.  Therefore, a recloser trips once a fault is detected to disconnect service then 
recloses a very short time later (a few seconds or less) to restore service once the arc 
has de-ionized.  If the fault has not cleared upon reclosure (the fault is not temporary), 
either the recloser will trip again – this time permanently – or other protective devices w
trip to isolate the fault.  Reclosers often trip temporarily more than once before 
permanent disconnection in order to remove temporary faults of a longer duration. [
 Sectionalizers are often used in conjunction with reclosers.  Sectionalizers are 
switches that can open to disconnect and isolate part of a system much like the other 
protective devices do.  However, sectionalizers are meant to be opened only while the
circuit is already de-energized.  When a fault is in fact permanent, a recloser may de-
energize the circuit by tripping for a prolonged duration, at which point sectionalizers ca
be opened to isolate the faulted section.  If DG is operating downstream from the 
recloser, the circuit will not be de-energized and sectionalizers cannot open.  Ot
protective devices downstream of the reclosers may suffer similar operational difficulties
These system disconnects are very important to the safety of maintenance personnel; 
DG can feed circuits from downstream that would otherwise be de-energized and 
warrant extra precaution [16]. 
 
Case 3a)  Figure IV.7 shows a distribution system that employs a recloser with multiple 
feeders downstream, each protected by fuses.  If DG is connected downstream of
recloser, the protection scheme will be compromised.  When a temporary fault occur
one of the feeders, the recloser should open quickly, allowing the arc to extinguish, then 
close again to restore service to the loads.  Under this scheme, fuses would be selecte
such that the MM time is less than the time it takes for the recloser to trip; this allow
fault to be cleared without dam
 the 
s on 
d 
s the 
age to the fuses.  With DG connected, fault current would 
ontinue to flow from this unit while the main source is disconnected by the recloser.  c
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Figure IV.7  Radial Distribution System with Recloser/Fuse Protection
This will have two adverse effects.  First, the DG’s fault contribution may be enough to 
maintain the arc while the recloser is open.  The temporary fault may then become a 
[semi-]permanent fault.  Second, the DG’s fault contribution will be passing through the 
fuse protecting the faulted line.  This may cause the fuse to trip for a fault that may 
otherwise have been quickly cleared by the recloser. 
 
 
 
Case3b)  The circuit in Figure IV.7 is also susceptible to another concern with DG on 
lines protected by reclosers.  If the DG unit connected downstream of the recloser 
continues operating during disconnect, the grid portion downstream of the recloser may 
form a temporary island (see section on islanding).  Reclosure would then be connecting 
34 
 
two energized systems.  If reclosure occurs between the larger upstream system and a 
small network with generation on it (an island), a connection may occur between the 
systems while they are out-of-phase.  This can cause serious damage to the DG unit as 
well as upstream grid equipment.  [14] 
 Both of the above cases imply the same necessity for DG operation downstream 
of reclosers: dard 
1547-2003 actually requires specifically that all DG must disconnect before reclosure for 
the DG unit is disconnected, the recloser can clear temporary faults and 
 There is also one issue that can affect all protective devices when DG is present: 
nuisance (or sympathetic) tripping.  Since DG adds an additional power supply to a 
system that theoretically has assumed this not to be the case, the added current present 
on the lines may cause devices to operate when there is no actual fault.  This event 
disconnects customers from service unnecessarily and deteriorates system reliability.  
This appears to be a relatively simple problem to resolve; since fault currents usually 
also increase with the presence of DG, devices should merely need to be set to trip for 
higher currents so that normal operation will not cause nuisance tripping.  Yet while 
the DG unit must disconnect before reclosure occurs.  The IEEE Stan
all faults.  If 
reconnect the system without risking out-of-phase connections, and the DG fault 
currents will not trip other devices.  This can be a difficult solution for the DG operator 
since the unit may be disconnected frequently.  Another drawback to this solution is that 
additional time may be required to allow for the DG to disconnect before the reclosure 
can occur; this additional time will need to be coordinated in any other protective devices 
and will cause temporary faults to be sustained for longer durations, decreasing power 
quality.  [16] 
 
Nuisance Tripping 
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nt.  This issue may appear simplistic, but it is actually quite common and 
ostly.  Abnormal operation or spikes in generation capacity and drops in load demand 
 tripping of devices thought to have been coordinated with DG 
at 
relays have adjustable settings, fuses would have to be replaced in order to set a new 
tripping curre
c
will result in nuisance
accounted for.  The majority of DG sites will experience operating difficulties like this 
during the first year in service and may require unanticipated system modifications th
can delay consistent energy production until solutions are found. [8] 
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V.  VOLTAGE REGULATION 
 For the purpose of ensuring high quality of power, the voltage levels along 
distribution lines must be regulated to remain within an acceptable range – typically 
within 5-10% of nominal operating voltage (ANSI standard is ±5%). [17]  In the case of a 
radial distribution line with downstream flow, the voltage at any point on the line will drop 
(decrease) proportionally to the distance that point lies from the source.  Furthermore, as 
the total loading on the line varies – say from peak consumption during the day to 
minimum consumption during the night – the voltage drops along the line will change 
accordingly.  These variations in voltage level do not pose a large threat to loads such 
as residential lightings systems, but they can actually be catastrophic for loads such as 
highly sensitive manufacturing equipment.  Grid operators are usually expected to 
provide a certain degree of power quality, and they therefore employ different methods 
of voltage regulation. 
 Transformers that feed distribution lines are often equipped with load tap 
changers (LTCs) to regulate voltage levels downstream.1  The LTC provides incremental 
changes (up or down) to the effective turns ratio of the transformer, thereby affecting 
changes in the line voltages.  These LTCs can be controlled automatically by a sensing 
device such as a line drop compensator (LDC) to mitigate load voltage fluctuations.  
Figure V.1[17: Fig. 4] shows a schematic of a distribution system that uses LDC.  By 
matching XL’ and RL’ with XL and RL, the voltage regulating relay (VRR) will adjust the 
tapping of the LTC to hold constant the voltage at the reference point (VRP).  It should be 
noted that this can only be accomplished to within a certain margin since the taps are 
incremental, not continuous, and there are minimum and maximum tap limits. 
 
1 Similar devices include step voltage regulators (SVR), load ratio control transformers (LRT), and others.  
The fundamental function of these devices is the same.  References to LTCs in this section can be taken to 
refer to all such devices. 
 Figure V.1  Distribution Line with LTC and LDC Voltage Regulation [17]
 
 Voltage regulation can also be accomplished through the control of reactive 
power flow on lines using switched capacitor banks, static var compensators (SVC), or 
even generators.  By injecting or consuming extra reactive power (vars) to/from a 
system, the voltage can be regulated.  The change in reactive power causes a change in 
current flow without necessitating extra real power; the change in current causes a 
change in the voltage drop across the lines it flows through.  Distribution system voltage 
can be thusly regulated by connecting or disconnecting capacitor banks at a substation 
or on distribution lines based on the loading conditions present.  SVCs can also be used 
to regulate voltage, but these devices – like most Flexible AC Transmission System 
(FACTS) devices – are used primarily on high voltage transmission systems [18].  Since 
some generators consume and/or supply reactive power, DG itself could be viewed as a 
type of voltage regulator.  However, this view would not be typically accurate.  While grid 
operators may use dispatchable generators to regulate voltage, most privately run DG 
operates in voltage-controlled mode, making it dependent on the constant voltage of the 
grid to be regulated by some other means.  This allows the DG operators to control 
power and power factor while avoiding accidental islanding; besides, most small DG 
units do not have the capacity to effectively regulate voltage levels [8].  Therefore, the 
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effects of DG presence on the existent methods of voltage regulation must be 
investigated. 
 
LTC Regulated Radial Distribution Line 
 As discussed in the section on protection scheme issues, DG units may need to 
be disconnected for faults more frequently than typical high voltage power plants.  
Whenever a significant source of DG is connected or disconnected from a distribution 
system, the line voltages will be altered.  If the change in voltage due to the DG going 
from online to offline – or vice versa – is significant, then voltage regulation techniques 
may fail.  Figure V.2 shows a radial distribution line with loads at various nodes along the 
line; the line is fed from a transformer with an LTC.  The model used here assumes 
equal loading at each node and equal spacing of the nodes.  The transformer is rated at 
5MVA, 33/12.4kV with tap increments of 1.5% (0.186kV).  The loads each consume 
250kVA at an 85% power factor and have (1.067+j0.241)Ω of impedance between them. 
Figure V.2  Radial Distribution Line for Investigation of Voltage Level Effects from DG
 
The system shown in Figure V.2 was first simulated without the DG connected, 
and then again with the DG, under various conditions.  The voltage profile for this line at 
full load without DG connected is shown in Figure V.3a; a 5% voltage variation margin is 
shown in red.  The profile is shifted upward (increased voltages) with the raising of the 
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LTC tap setting; the variance of node voltages from the nominal 1.0 per unit is minimized 
at a tap of 6% or 7.5%.  Without an LTC employed (tap=0), the voltage at node 5 drops 
to 0.9p.u. – far below the acceptable 5% margin.  For this reason, using a simple 
33kV:12.4kV transformer would be unacceptable.  Instead, an LTC should be used to 
regulate the voltage and, by observation of the profiles, an LDC that uses node 4 as the 
reference point of regulation would minimize voltage deviations.  For decreased loading, 
the voltage profile will improve; with less power flowing, the voltage drops along the line 
will be decreased.  Node 4 will be an acceptable reference point for lighter loads as well, 
and voltage variations will be slighter.  This can be observed in Figures V.4a&b, which 
show the profiles for 30% loading. 
Figure V.3a  Full Load Voltage Profile w/o DG      Figure V.3b  Full Load Voltage Profile w/ DG
Figure V.4a  30% Load Voltage Profile w/o DG      Figure V.4b  30% Load Voltage Profile w/ DG
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 Figure V.3b shows the voltage profile of the line when the DG unit is connected 
to node 6.  This shows a drastic improvement to the profile due to the addition of DG.  
Since this unit provides power locally to the loads, less current is supplied through the 
transformer and there is less voltage drop from line losses.  A tap of 6% is still ideal for 
minimizing voltage deviations, and a reference point at node 4 is still acceptable.  While 
the DG is connected, the voltage regulation of this line is improved significantly.  
However, the system must be able to handle the DG coming on- and off-line.  It is often 
possible to bring a generator online gradually, but disconnects may happen often and 
instantaneously.  From Figure V.3b, when the DG is connected and the system is at 
100% load with the LTC at a 6% tap, the voltage at node 9 is 0.9845p.u. (12.21kV).  If 
the DG were to suddenly disconnect for a temporary fault, the system would jump to the 
profile of Figure V.3a upon reclosure and the voltage at node 9 would be 0.9618p.u. 
(11.93kV).  This means that loads at node 9 would see a sudden dip of 280V when the 
DG disconnects; other nodes on this system would see similar dips.  This may not pose 
a dire threat since voltages would remain within 5% of nominal, but as the amount of DG 
on the system increases, the results become more serious.  If identical DG units were 
added to nodes 7 & 9 as well as node 6 and a temporary fault at node 4 caused them all 
to disconnect, node 9 would see a spike of 998V.  Node 9 would be at 6.9% below 
nominal voltage and a change in the tap of the LTC would immediately be necessitated.  
This situation could cause severe undervoltages that the LTC is not likely to be able to 
handle quickly enough. 
For this system, node 6 was chosen arbitrarily as the point of connection for DG.  
However, if the point of connection could be chosen by grid operators, then the benefits 
of DG to voltage regulation could be maximized.  Figure V.5 shows graphs of the voltage 
profile for the DG unit connected at each node.  Loading was at 100%, and the LTC was 
held constant at a tap of 6%.  It can be observed from the graphs that voltage regulation 
is improved more for DG connection further from the source, at the end of the line where 
voltage drop is normally greatest.  The graph below indicates how the effects of DG on 
voltage regulation can best be mitigated when a choice in the point of interconnection is 
available. 
 
 
Figure V.5  Voltage Profiles at Various Points of DG Connection 
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VI.  INTERMITTENCY / FLUCTUATING SOURCES 
 Some forms of DG, such as photovoltaics (PVs) and wind generators, provide 
power at unpredictably intermittent intervals.  There is no way to control this behavior, 
short of controlling the weather itself.  In order to use such generators to provide 
constant power output, storage devices and inverters can be used to regulate output.  
However, these solutions will decrease efficiencies and increase costs.  Large wind 
farms sometimes employ static var compensators or other active voltage control 
techniques, but these large systems combine many (sometimes several hundred) 
individual turbines and feed the combined power to high voltage transmission systems 
[8].  This is not likely to be a feasible option for a small scale DG site that may employ 
only a few wind turbines, or even just one.  Designing a stable grid system with an 
unknown amount of generation can be an arduous task.  When the maximum possible 
power produced from DG is small in relation to nearby power flows (low DG penetration), 
it may be possible to design the system with minimal concerns to the behavior of the 
generation.  However, if the total power from DG units in a given region is significant in 
relation to power flows within that region (high DG penetration), then the DG behavior 
must be accounted for. 
 Large power plants that produce hundreds or thousands of MW are equipped 
with some form of “throttling” that allows operators to regulate the output quite precisely.  
It is because of this control that extensive interconnectivity of power systems is possible.  
Controlling the output to maintain a very small margin of voltage levels and frequency 
enables many large networks to be interconnected at the high voltage level.  Controlling 
the power angle of these interconnected networks allows for power flow to be directed 
so that one network can import power from another.  This is the typical fashion in which 
energy is dispersed to customers: they set demands, and system operators find an 
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available supply that can be directed to the demand.  This works under the assumption 
that generation capabilities are known and controllable.  Of course, a 100kW DG unit is 
going to have virtually no effect on the ability to manipulate the GWs of power flow on 
high voltage transmission lines.  However, thousands of 100kW systems might, and just 
one small system could affect the power flow of the local distribution system it is 
connected to. 
 Previous sections mentioned briefly that DG systems will, by nature, have lower 
reliability than typical large power plants.  They may be out of service much more 
frequently due to disconnection necessities for faults, which can take significant time 
before bringing them back online.  Yet, DG units that have unpredictable outputs even 
when they are online will have much less benefit to offer.  Today, some utilities still use 
extremely inefficient diesel generators as peakers.  When demand levels rise extremely 
high, these inefficient generators can be an economically sensible solution.  One of the 
reasons these generators provide a suitable solution is that they can be dispatched very 
quickly – that is, they can be brought online quickly at anytime with a known output 
capacity.  A DG unit with greater efficiencies would be capable of providing similar 
beneficial applications, but it would have to be dependable.  If demand levels rose 
drastically on a cloudy day with low winds, solar units and wind turbines may be able to 
offer very little help.  However, this does not eliminate these DG systems as viable 
solutions.  Some areas – such as the Los Angeles Metro region in southern California – 
see their greatest demands during hot summer months at midday when solar units 
would have their greatest output capacities. 
 In any case, when generators are dependent on variables beyond human control, 
the systems they connect to must be able to handle all possible cases.  This means that 
the intermittency of some DG will force design considerations in the areas of power flow 
directions, protection schemes, voltage regulation, and more.  The unpredictable 
variables that govern these systems (i.e. wind and sun) are not completely 
unpredictable; they are predictable to some degree.  A solar-powered unit would never 
experience an instantaneous transition from full sunlight conditions to pitch darkness, for 
example.  However, a wind turbine could experience rather quick changes of input 
power during strong gusts.  Figures VI.1a2 & b3 show examples of daily output for a 
photovoltaic system and a wind turbine, respectively.  The PV system of Figure VI.1a is 
located at Vantage Point High School in Northglenn, CO, while the wind turbine of Figure 
VI.1b is located at Dolan Labs in Groveport, OH.  Each Figure shows data for the day of 
1Jan, 2010.  Both sites provide open access to real-time data of these systems year-
round on the internet. 
        Figure VI.1a2  PV System Daily Output                 Figure VI.1b3  Wind Turbine Daily Output
 
Both of the graphs shown above illustrate examples of systems that can 
transition from maximum output to zero output in the course of a day.  This equates to 
the variation between the condition of no DG installed on a system to the condition of an 
online DG system in the cases discussed in the previous sections.  However, a PV 
system typically makes this transition more gradually than a wind turbine.  A solar-
                                                            
2 Source: http://cosolarschools.org/schools/vantagepoint‐fs.html 
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3 Source: http://www.aep.com/environmental/education/wind/groveport.aspx 
powered system also tends to follow load demand since both are high during the day 
and minimal at night. 
The intermittency of such DG units further warrants the necessity of the 
distribution system of connection to be capable of handling maximum output as well as 
minimal, or zero, output.  Power flows may be reversed, or at least changed, between 
conditions of maximum and minimum DG output.  Fault current contributions of DG will 
also change with the level of output at the time of fault and the protection devices, 
therefore, will need to function properly for all possible values of output power.  This 
could make coordination particularly tricky.  To investigate one particular way this 
difficulty could manifest itself, reconsider the system of the relay protection section.  This 
system is shown again below in Figure VI.2. 
 
Figure VI.2  Radial Distribution System with DG, Protected by Relays
 
 With DG connected and running on the system shown above, it would be desired 
that relay R1 provide protection for faults at Bus 1 for the upstream flow of the DG units.  
Of the two connected DG units, R1 would see more fault current than R2 and could, 
therefore, be coordinated to trip first in this instance.  However, consider the case that 
DG1 is a wind turbine generator and that a fault occurs on Bus 1 at a time when no wind 
is blowing.  In this case, R1 and R2 would see the same fault current from DG2, which 
45 
 
46 
 
means that R2 might trip if the coordination was relying on R1 having larger fault current.  
Then if the wind picks up before the fault was cleared, DG1 would begin generating and 
R1 would trip as well (or else the fault would be fed once again).  On a larger system 
with many more buses and multiple DG connections, this type of situation could cause 
numerous breakers to trip for a fault that actually only required one device to trip.  When 
coordinating protection systems, any intermittent DG systems will require that the 
protection be capable of handling faults during all possible output level combinations of 
the DG units. 
 Intermittency will also affect voltage regulation in manners similar to the 
online/offline variations discussed previously.  Generators with rapid fluctuations will 
cause greater disturbance.  Referring back to Figures VI.1b, it is observed that the 
output of a wind turbine may change by more than 50% in a matter of minutes; extreme 
conditions could be even worse.  This has stronger implications on voltage regulation 
capabilities than a generator with smoother, more gradual changes like the PV system of 
Figure VI.1a.  The reason for this lies primarily in the switching time of regulators such 
as a load tap changer (LTC).  As discussed in the section on voltage regulation, DG will 
usually cause a voltage boost at the point of connection.  This boost in voltage might 
then require the LTC to operate at a lower tap since less voltage droops are seen along 
the distribution line.  If the DG were to disconnect (or drastically lower its output power), 
the tap setting of the LTC would need to be raised.  The control system for an LTC is 
often able to change at rates that follow changes in voltage levels caused by the rising 
and lowering output power seen from a PV system.  However, most LTC controls are not 
likely to be capable of tracking the rapid changes that would result from a wind turbine 
connection, and in some cases PV systems would become problematic as well [8]. 
VII.  HARMONIC DISTORTION 
 Ideally, the voltages and currents on lines of a power grid network would be 
purely sinusoidal at precisely the fundamental frequency desired (60Hz in the U.S.).  
However, there is always some degree of distortion that cannot be avoided.  Generators, 
loads, and equipment on grids can all contribute to distortions in voltage and, more 
commonly, in current.  These distortions can be mathematically quantified by harmonic 
content through Fourier analysis.  However distorted a waveform is, it can be 
represented as a series of harmonic sinusoids. An ideal waveform would have only one 
frequency component at the fundamental frequency, but a distorted waveform would 
contain components at frequencies of integer multiples of the fundamental frequency.  
Figure VII.1 shows an example of a current waveform with harmonic distortion; the line 
current is obviously non-sinusoidal, but it can be expressed as the sum of three sine 
waves.  The figure shows the three harmonic components that comprise the current 
waveform.  A common method used by power engineers to quantify the amount of 
distortion present in a waveform is known as total harmonic distortion (THD).  The THD 
of a waveform is the ratio of the rms value of its non-fundamental frequency components 
to the rms value of the fundamental component [19].  The THD of the current in Figure 
VII.1 is computed as follows: 
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Figure VII.1  Distorted Current Waveform & Harmonic Components 
 
 THD is a figure commonly used to express the level of distortion a waveform 
contains, but by itself it does not fully describe harmonic content.  A current with a THD 
of 5% may have all 5% of its distortion at the 3rd harmonic, or it may have its distortion 
spread over components ranging from the 11th harmonic to the 33rd harmonic.  The 3rd 
harmonic is particularly dangerous to a power system, while very high frequency 
distortion may be more readily filtered.  However, high frequency harmonics produce 
greater voltage drops along lines because of increased skin effect.  Triplen Harmonics 
(3rd, 9th, 15th, etc.) are highly problematic for power systems with grounding because they 
produce zero sequence currents, meaning that they produce current in the neutral wire.  
Since the value of THD does not fully characterize the distortion of a waveform, IEEE 
standard 519 limits not only the acceptable THD levels, but also the acceptable levels for 
individual harmonic components.  The limits from this standard are shown in Table VII.A. 
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Table VII.A  IEEE 519 Current & Voltage Distortion Limits 
 
 
Negative Effects of Harmonics 
 The presence of harmonics in a power system is dangerous for various reasons.  
If a line is carrying rated current at the fundamental frequency but has additional 
harmonic currents, then the total effective current is above the rated value.  This 
additional current will contribute to the voltage drops across lines and other equipment 
causes voltage regulation problems.  As mentioned, high frequency currents cause 
greater voltage drops (compared to low frequency currents of equal rms value) because 
the resistance of conductors increases with increasing frequency [19].  Aside from just 
increasing voltage drops, these harmonic currents will also increase the heating within 
conductors.  For this reason, conductors may actually overheat while carrying rated rms 
current.  Neutral conductors in a grounded three-phase four-wire system are particularly 
susceptible to these currents, since triplen harmonics will create zero sequence currents 
49 
 
50 
 
(current in the neutral wire).  Ground conductors are generally not rated for high current 
and are often not protected by circuit breakers like the phase conductors are.  However, 
the neutral conductor is often monitored by relays to indentify ground faults.  In this case, 
harmonic currents may cause the breakers on the phase conductors to trip when no fault 
is present [20]. 
 Harmonics will also have adverse effects on other grid equipment such as 
transformers and capacitors.  Much like the effects within conductors, harmonic currents 
add losses in transformers both electrically and magnetically; the additional current 
contributes to the losses in the conductor windings as well as core losses seen by the 
magnetic flux.  Harmonics, therefore, derate transformers through the increased losses 
in impendence, eddy currents, and hysteresis.  To derate a transformer is to determine 
the actual current it is capable of carrying (less than rated value) due to internal losses 
generated by harmonics.  Capacitors do not generate any harmonics on a system, but 
they can possibly create resonance if there are certain harmonics present.  Line 
capacitance can actually be rather dynamic since banks are switched off and on lines to 
control power factors.  If a system’s resonant frequency at any time, which changes with 
changing capacitance, occurs near a harmonic frequency that is present, the resonance 
will amplify that harmonic and exacerbate the problem. [19] 
 
Harmonic Contribution of DG 
 Some forms of DG employ newer forms of generation that can only produce DC 
current, such as photovoltaics and fuel cells.  In order for these generators to be 
connected to the grid, a DC-AC inverter must be used.  Some AC generators, like wind 
turbines and microturbines, also use converters to produce acceptable outputs for grid 
connection [21].  Inverters/converters all use high-speed switching in order to produce 
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sinusoidal outputs.  These outputs are never purely sinusoidal since they are produced 
by discrete switching and, therefore, they also produce harmonics.  It is not possible to 
obtain a pure and continuous sine wave from discrete switching, but modern inverter 
technologies allow for outputs to come extremely close. 
 It is worth noting that most of the concern over harmonic contributions of 
inverters has been due to the fact that older inverters that used line-commutation 
produced high levels of harmonic currents [22].  Most inverters used for grid-
interconnections today employ self-commutation with pulse width modulation (PWM) that 
generates much cleaner (more sinusoidal) outputs.  Because modern inverter 
technology is able to reduce harmonic injections so well, the harmonic distortion 
concerns of DG units is rather negligible when compared to harmonic contributions of 
the non-linear loads commonly connected to grids. [20]  Non-linear loads that contribute 
harmonics include arc furnaces, personal computers, adjustable speed drives, and even 
motors.  These loads are used extensively by various electricity customers, so they are 
basically unavoidable.  Therefore, grid operators must find methods of suppressing 
harmonics. 
 Though inverter technology developments have greater reduced concerns with 
DG grid-interconnects, the issues of harmonic distortion should still be considered along 
with DG installation projects.  Any DG unit that is to be connected to the grid will need to 
produce output which has harmonic content within the limits outlined in Table VII.A, but 
engineering beyond these minimal requirements will add to the benefits DG has to offer 
grid operation.  In areas of distribution that services high levels of non-linear loads, even 
small amounts of additional harmonics due to DG can be problematic.  The local 
harmonic distortion in existence should be considered when siting new DG installations.  
The inverter control methods, such as power filtering, can be used to mitigate the 
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harmonic injection of generation units as well as non-linear loads.  If a new DG site will 
be employing harmonic suppression techniques, it should be done with consideration of 
other harmonic sources present.  In this manner, costs can be mitigated, concerns can 
be minimized, and benefits can be maximized. 
 
Power Filtering 
 One common method of harmonic suppression is by use of active power filters 
(APF) or passive power filters (PPF).  Both filters function in roughly the same manner; 
they are, in essence, LRC tanks – a circuit composed of inductance, capacitance, and 
resistance.  A PPF would be made of static impedances based on assumed loading.  
They are widely used because of their reliability and their simplicity, which makes them 
cheaper and easier to maintain.  However, PPFs tend degrade faster and are highly 
susceptible to frequency changes of the grid; in some cases, the PPF can become 
resonant with the system and cause operational problems for the system and the filter.  
APFs, on the other hand, provide dynamic compensation by injecting current that 
matches harmonic current present but is 180 degrees out of phase with it.  The effect is 
the negation of those harmonic currents so that the current seen by the system is more 
ideal.  APFs provide the benefit of compensating inconsistent dynamics on the system, 
but need further development before they become widely applicable; limitations needing 
improvement are cost, losses, and reliability.  [23] 
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Figure VII.2  Harmonic Reduction with APF
 Figure VII.2 shows the benefits 
offered by power filtering.  Figures (a) & 
(b) show an example of the load voltage 
and current drawn by a commercial 
building during start-up of its air 
conditioner.  Figure (c) shows the current 
injected by a local APF, and Figure (d) 
shows the resulting line current.  Without 
the APF, the line current would match the 
load current (containing many harmonics), but the injected APF current results in 
significantly smoothed line current with highly reduced harmonics. 
 
Concern for Harmonics from DG 
 Compared to the other issues of DG discussed in this paper, harmonic 
contribution is not of high concern; the harmonics caused by non-linear loads and 
transients tend to be far more significant than those caused by inverter-based DG [20, 
22].  DG operators must ensure that they do not exceed the harmonic limits of IEEE 
Standard 519, but this usually requires only that a modestly sophisticated inverter be 
used when one is needed.  If the inverter system desired, or other supportive equipment, 
produces abnormally high levels of harmonics, a power filter can be used to remove 
these distortions.  
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VIII.  ISLANDING 
 The concept of islanding on a grid system is unique insofar as it is regarded as a 
dangerous problem to be avoided in some cases, but regarded as a benefit to system 
performance in other cases.  An island refers to a section of the distribution grid that has 
been disconnected from the rest of the grid network but is still energized by local 
generation – this is sometimes referred to as a microgrid whenthe islanded section is 
intentional design to be capable of supporting itself as an independent grid.  When a 
breaker, fuse, or other type of switch trips upstream from one or more generators, but 
those generators continue to supply local loads that are also downstream of the 
disconnect, those generators, loads, and other connected equipment then comprise an 
island.  The issue of islanding was addressed briefly in the previous section on 
protection through auto-reclosers, but this section looks at the issue more in depth.  
Figure VIII.1 shows an example of a system where an island could form.  If a fault 
occurred at Bus 2 and Fuse 2 tripped from the contribution of the DG connected at Bus 
4, then the DG unit and all the loads on Bus 4 would comprise an island. 
 
Figure VIII.1  Distribution System that is Susceptible to Islanding 
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 The system shown above could form an island because the amount of power 
generated by the DG unit approximately matches the power demand of the attached 
loads; this is the primary condition that must hold for an island to sustain.  For this 
reason, DG units with built-in power control (such as synchronous generators and self-
commutated inverters) are more likely to form islands than those with external sources of 
excitation [13].  In most cases, long-term islands formed (or potentially formed) by DG 
would function poorly at best because DG is rarely equipped with the capability to 
regulate voltage or match power demand.  The power demand of most load feeders 
changes fairly regularly, and the output of some DG units changes regularly as well (see 
Intermittency).  However, if a disconnect occurs upstream of a system like that of Figure 
VIII.1 when the right conditions are met, an island will form even if only temporarily.  
Temporary islanding is far more common than the currently rare cases of long-term 
islanding, but it still poses a severe threat to the power system and the DG unit itself 
[16].  As DG penetrations are increasing and advancing technologies are increasing the 
efficiency of DG control methods, the probability of islanding occurrences also increases 
[24]. 
 The issue of islanding (and protection from it) is currently the greatest obstacle in 
realizing the benefits of DG, and this issue is therefore under much research and 
development [13, 16, 24, 25].  Nearly all utility standards dictate that anti-islanding 
protection be implemented for DG installations, with few exceptions only for very small 
synchronous generators and self-commutated inverters [9, 13].  One such standard is 
IEEE 1547, which also proposes that small-scale photovoltaic installations within a 
region be limited to one-third of peak load demand to avoid islanding from high 
penetration of small units.  This standard, however, is currently being expanded to 
establish criteria by which islanding can be permitted so that the full benefits DG can 
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offer might be realized [25].  Until the complications of islanding are overcome, utilities 
require that all significant DG units disconnect within 10 cycles (0.17s) or less when loss 
of utility service is detected [22].  The difficulty in detecting such loss, however, is partly 
what makes the issue of islanding so complicated. 
 
Problems Encountered from Unintentional Islanding 
 Although standards generally provide that all systems have protection to prevent 
it, islanding does still occur on occasion.  When an island is formed, it presents a danger 
to both grid equipment and maintenance personnel.  Disconnects usually occur to 
remove a fault on the system, and maintenance personnel may subsequently be sent 
out to clear the fault.  The disconnect would likely be meant to de-energize all 
downstream lines, but the DG supported island may actually be keeping some lines 
energized and thereby pose electrocution threats to maintenance crews.  For this and 
other reasons, maintenance personnel must take special precautions in areas with DG 
to ensure that lines are de-energized before attempting to work on the system or 
reconnect it.  The extension of precaution that is necessary may actually reduce service 
reliability since faults may take longer to clear. 
 DG units are typically not designed to support sections of the grid alone; they 
generally rely on the virtually ideal voltage support provided by the grid.  In an 
unintended island scenario, the DG will have no sufficient means to regulate voltage or 
frequency on the connected lines.  This can quickly result in extremely poor power 
quality for all connected equipment and cause permanent damage to loads, utility 
equipment, or DG units themselves. 
 The greatest problem is that even if the voltage and frequency of the island are 
able to be maintained within acceptable limits, the island will still drift quickly out-of-
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phase with the grid once disconnect occurs [22].  If an island and grid are reconnected 
while out-of-phase, again severe damage to equipment is the result.  The dangers of 
out-of-phase connection contributes to the delay in restoring service when an island has 
formed; generally, the DG on the island must be taken offline so the utility can reconnect 
to de-energized lines, then the DG can be brought back online.  As mentioned 
previously, the most commonly encountered danger of islanding is that out-of-phase 
reconnection inhibits the ability to implement auto-reclosing.  This phenomenon is far 
more common because the island need only be formed momentarily for reclosure to be 
inhibited.  Most DG is found on grid sections where the local load demand is significantly 
different from DG supply capacity; an island would not sustain in these cases.  However, 
loading even in these areas may vary enough that, at some given time instance, the DG 
output very closely matches the load demand.  If a fault occurred at this moment and a 
recloser was tripped, the reclosure would then reconnect two out-of-phase systems.  
This “perfect storm” scenario is usually very unlikely, but the danger is very real and 
common islanding detection methods cannot protect against this situation.  Most anti-
islanding protection functions on the basis that DG capabilities will be insufficient to 
properly sustain proper voltage and frequency on the islanded system. 
 
Detection & Protection Methods 
 Current utility standards require that all DG disconnect rapidly whenever utility 
service is lost so that the harmful effects of islanding can be avoided.  Protection during 
loss of utility power to a section of the grid to which the DG is connected is typically 
referred to as loss of grid protection (LOG protection).  An LOG occurrence is produced 
from switching on the system that can result from fault clearance, equipment failure, load 
shedding, or maintenance outages.  The goal of LOG protection is to detect the 
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occurrence quickly (regardless of cause) and to disconnect the DG within the timeframe 
established by utility standards.  Commonly used methods are usually of either the 
passive method or active method variety.  Passive methods detect LOG by simply taking 
measurements at the DG unit’s point of connection to the grid.  Active methods, on the 
other hand, inject slight disturbances to the system at the point of connection and 
observe the response.  Newer forms of LOG detection use telecommunication signals, 
which can also have applications for implementing intentional islanding and synchronous 
reclosing.  In many cases, DG is protected from islanding by a combination of multiple 
methods of LOG detection. 
 
Passive Methods 
 In most cases of LOG, the power produced by DG will not match the power 
consumed by attached loads, and passive methods can detect the situation easily by 
voltage and/or frequency monitoring.  The most typical case today is found with small 
penetration of DG that is insufficient to power local loads alone.  The LOG will overload 
the DG unit(s) and the voltage and frequency will quickly collapse.  In the rarer case 
where DG supplies more power than local loading demands, LOG will cause 
overvoltage.  Passive methods are simple, cheap solutions that can be used to remove 
DG very quickly when there is a significant power mismatch during LOG. 
 The most prevalent form of traditional LOG detection is under/over voltage and 
under/over frequency relaying [24].  This method is usually effective for small DG units 
because the units typically are greatly insufficient for supporting system voltage or 
frequency without grid service, so LOG causes immediate drops in both that is quickly 
detected.  Yet they can fail if the DG system is able to maintain voltage and frequency – 
or fail to operate quickly enough if the DG can maintain the system even for a second or 
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Figure VIII.2  Non-Detection Zone [24]
two.  Therefore, under/over relays may be 
insufficient for large DG units, or in areas of high 
penetration.  This method inherently has a non-
detection zone (NDZ), which refers to the range of 
power mismatch between DG and loads for which 
LOG will not be detected.  If the LOG occurrence 
only slightly – within the tripping limits of the 
relay – the relays will not trip.  Figure VIII.2 from [24] shows a general example of the 
NDZ of these relays.  Under/over voltage and frequency techniques are quite effective 
and useful for most DG, but their shortcomings must be recognized for instances where 
power mismatch may be low. 
cause the voltage and/or frequency to change 
 
 Newer methods of passive detection have been developed to provided smaller 
NDZs and more reliable protection.  One such method is referred to as rate of change of 
frequency (ROCOF), which still is accomplished by observing changes in frequency at 
the point of DG connection.  The relay will disconnect the DG when the ROCOF exceeds 
a preset value over a set interval of time (the operating time).  A typical optimized setting 
for ROCOF relays used on small or medium sized DG units is 0.3Hz/s with an operating 
time of 0.3-0.7s, but extreme frequency changes may provide for an operating time as 
low as 4 cycles (0.07s).  This method still has an inherent NDZ due to the fact that over-
sensitivity of the relay settings will cause a disconnect for commonplace system 
disturbances as well as LOG, but the NDZ is usually quite narrow in comparison to 
typically expected responses to LOG.  Phase displacement monitoring and rate of 
change of generator power output are other passive techniques closely related to the 
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ROCOF method.  These methods all have the inherent advantage that in the case of a 
failure to operate in the first instance of system disturbance, they would still operate for 
the subsequent instance immediately following.  [9] 
 Another passive method that has been developed to increase sensitivity of LOG 
detection is that of vector shift (VS), also called vector surge.  VS detection is 
accomplished through continuous measurements of the cycle duration of waveforms at 
the point of DG connection, comparing each measurement with the previous one.  The 
difference in cycle duration times will increase when there is a power mismatch.  
Essentially, this method is still measuring frequency changes like ROCOF.  However, 
the difference with this method is that measurements are compared with previous 
measurements instead of with a preset value.  This gives VS detection the advantage of 
extremely quick detection of islanding (one cycle), and they are therefore often 
implemented without time delays.  Typical VS relay settings are to operate when there is 
a change in cycle duration of around 8° to 12°. 
 Other, less common, methods of passive detection are also studied and used, 
but most are a variation on the principles employed by those discussed above.  Every 
method is unable to escape one fundamental downfall: they must not be so sensitive 
that they trip for commonplace disturbances, so they cannot detect islanding if the power 
match is close enough that the disturbances caused are slight and within that typical 
range. 
 
Active Methods 
 Active methods of LOG detection do not merely make measurements of system 
characteristics like passive methods do; they involve the intentional injection of 
disturbances to the system and then measure the response.  This form of detection 
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commonly comes under criticisms due to the fact they reduce power quality and are 
usually only applicable for inverter-based DG [16].  Inverter-based DG is more suited for 
the use of active detection methods because the inverter itself is well suited for 
implementing the small disturbances to be observed.  While these disturbances are 
usually slight, the use of active detection is not permitted on some networks due to 
concerns of power quality degradation [24]. 
 One form of active detection, known as reactive power export error detection, is 
accomplished by control of reactive power generation.  Most modern inverters allow for 
control of the power factor of generation, or by extension, for control on the quantity of 
reactive power produced.  This ability can be used to set the level of reactive power 
exported from the DG to such a level that may only be sustained if there is connection to 
the utility source.  For an LOG occurrence, the actual reactive power generated will 
deviate from its set value and the relay will disconnect the DG.  There are, of course, 
fluctuations in the output from the DG under normal operation.  The operating time of 
this detection method must be greater than the duration of typical fluctuations.  This 
results in relatively slow operation with typical operating times of 2s to 5s.  However, this 
method is capable of detecting island formation even when the LOG causes no change 
in DG loading.  Because it operates slowly but detects islanding situations that other 
methods cannot, this method is generally applied for back-up to the faster methods 
discussed. 
 As illustrated in previous sections, the fault current contribution from the utility 
source is far greater than even significantly large DG units’ contributions.  This fact is 
used to implement system fault level monitoring as a LOG detection method.  By firing 
thyristors to connect a shunt inductor at the point of DG supply, at short circuit is 
produced.  The thyristors would be fired for a very short duration, just prior to zero 
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current occurrence.  This short would cause a brief surge of current through the inductor 
and a spike in voltage, allowing for a measurement of the fault level.  The fault level will 
be drastically higher when there is connection to the utility grid than when the DG is 
islanded, which makes the tripping decision of the relay very accurate.  This accuracy 
allows for extremely fast operating times as low as half of a cycle [9].  The primary short-
coming of this method is the adverse effects to power quality from injecting waveform 
spikes and introducing additional harmonics. 
 While active methods are currently used effectively to avoid islanding events, the 
methods are fundamentally based on the creation of disturbances.  They may have 
some suitable applications, but their reliance on disturbing a system that is already 
disturbed by DG’s presence makes it ill-suited as a widespread solution to islanding 
concerns. 
 
Communication-Based Methods 
 In addition to passive and active detection methods, communication-based 
methods (sometimes called intertripping) can be implemented.  This method is far less 
common in implementation, but is the source of much speculation and research.  This 
method is superior insofar as it has no NDZ and does not interfere with normal system 
operation in any way.  This method is based on the fact that the virtually exclusive cause 
of islanding is a result of the tripping of grid switching equipment.  Therefore, using 
communication channels to relay the occurrence of a switch trip to any DG downstream 
presents a reliable source of LOG detection.  The level of reliability in detection is 
dependent solely on the reliability of the communication channel.  Likewise, the 
operating time depends strictly on the speed of propagation of the communication signal; 
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no forced time delay is needed since the DG should ideally disconnect immediately 
when a disconnect from the grid occurs. 
 Communication based methods theoretically offer the possibility of very robust 
protection, but its primary hindrances are the level of complexity and cost that will match 
its level of robustness.  The communication medium would have to be fast and reliable in 
order to be effective.  Some systems suggested by [24] include SCADA, permanent IP 
connection, wireless GPRS, and radio links.  All of these systems present viable 
application as a means of LOG detection, but each also has its limitations.  There are 
not currently utility standards for the use of telecommunication for DG operation, but they 
may be developed as DG penetrations increase.  One method to protect the grid from 
the failure of telecommunication detection methods is to use “allowance signaling” or 
“enable signaling”.  That is, a signal would be generated from a substation that “allowed” 
the operation of DG downstream, but the signal would cease upon a switching that 
disconnected the DG from the grid.  This provides that DG would disconnect upon 
communication failure to protect against the case of an LOG occurrence while 
communication was down.  Furthermore, by using a generic signal of allowance, multiple 
DG units downstream can be protected using the one signal.  This provides particular 
benefit in the case of residential areas where PV penetration is significantly high.  If 
many inverters connected in one area of distribution all used active methods of islanding 
protection, power quality level could drop too low.  Using a single communication signal 
to allow or disallow the connection of all inverters could be highly preferable.  However, 
a single signal will not always be sufficient.  In some cases, switching will island some 
DG units but not others.  It may also be the case that some DG is connected to the grid 
by multiple switches, making a LOG occurrence dependent on the state of all relevant 
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switches, not just one.  These complexities will affect the cost and reliability of the 
protection scheme. 
 One clever method of using communication signals for protection is to use the 
distribution lines themselves, as suggested in [24].  A high frequency signal can be 
generated on the bus at the substation, which would propagate along on the 
downstream distribution lines (assuming downstream flow).  This can serve as the 
“allowance signal” for all connected DG sites, and the need for a separate 
communication channel can be eliminated.  Furthermore, it provides a novel means of 
creating a simple, but highly reliable, method of LOG detection.  Regardless of how 
many switches may or may not connect any given DG unit to the grid, this signal created 
at the substation will only reach those units whose grid connection is intact. 
 To provide electric services in modern infrastructures, most grids are currently 
under much communication developments.  New “smart grids” will have established 
methods of reliable communication for the status of nodes throughout the grid.  As these 
developments take root, they may provide a convenient means for communication-
based islanding protection. 
 
Intentional Islanding 
 Regulations on utility grids rarely allow for DG to continue operation in an 
islanded situation; this is primarily due to concern for out-of-synchronism reclosure.  If 
the issue of loss of synchronism were tackled, the use of DG to create viable islands 
would likely gain swift support [9].  Intentional allowance of island formation would 
increase system reliability and provide back-up power supply to loads when grid supply 
is lost.  Intentional islanding can only be applied in cases where the available DG is 
capable of supporting the island.  This means that the DG must be of a capacity greater 
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than the load demand of all possible connected loads and it must have sufficient 
capabilities for maintaining voltage and frequency on the island without grid support.  In 
order to avoid momentary interruptions on loads during a disconnect that forms the 
island, a static device must be employed for switching.  The DG unit must also be 
capable of handling any inrush it may experience when it is initially switched into island 
mode, and it must be able to detect any faults within the island and disconnect 
accordingly.  All of these requirements can be met with relatively modest technologies 
and engineering assuming that the costs and benefits justify it – the technical hurdle 
here lies in synchronism. 
 Any island will run out of synchronism with the grid unless it is somehow forced 
into synchronicity.  Proposed methods of keeping an island in sync with the 
disconnected grid are closely reminiscent of methods of communication-based LOG 
detection mentioned above.  The general idea is that the island and the grid must 
communicate (independently of power connections) in order to match up in phase before 
the two can be reconnected.  Ideally, control systems would keep the island operating in 
synchronism with the grid at all times so that reconnection could occur at any time.  This 
type of control may be much simpler today as new circuit breaker technology offers the 
possibility of exchanging information between the systems on either side of a switch [26].  
Another method is to transmit a reference waveform signal for a secure nearby point of 
the grid (likely from the immediately upstream substation) to downstream DG.  This 
signal can be used by the DG to govern the frequency and phase of the island such that 
it matches that of the grid. 
 Time delay and phase angle variation must be carefully considered and 
calculated for communications to be successful in obtaining synchronism.  Hard-line 
connections for transmitting the signal, such as fiber-optics, or telephone lines, could 
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introduce time delays on the order of 100ms to 300ms.  Short-range FM radio 
transmission could be used to obtain more negligible delays, but this technique would be 
less suited for broader application of networks with multiple DG units and multiple island 
configuration possibilities.  Time stamped global positioning system (GPS) 
measurements can provide accuracy to within 1µs with a phase error of 0.018 [9].  The 
time stamping will allow for phase alignment at the DG despite transmission delays.  The 
measurements are likely to be made at a point other than the point of 
connection/disconnection between grid and island – i.e. at the substation instead of at 
the tripped switch.  For this reason, there will be some degree of phase angle variation 
between the reference signal and the waveform at the point of reconnection.  Likewise, 
there may be a variation between the waveform produced by the DG and the point of 
reconnection.  These variations would have to be quantified beforehand, through 
knowledge of system characteristics such as load flow and impedances so that the 
precise phase of the waveforms at the intertie could be determined. 
 Synchronizing an island during grid disconnection is currently the biggest 
impediment in using DG islanding to improve system reliability, but other difficulties 
would also need to be overcome were methods of synchronism to be successful.  
Detection of the state of the DG (islanded vs. grid-connected) would be necessary for 
implementing control system.  However, reconnection could be hard to detect when the 
two systems are tightly synchronized because there would be minimal transient effects.  
It has been suggested by [9] that the steady-state phase difference between the two 
systems is likely to be an effective means of detection since it should vary more greatly 
during islanded operation than when connection is restored.  Furthermore, coordinating 
protection schemes for networks where islanding may occur could be particularly 
difficult.  Power flow may change directions between normal and islanded operation 
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modes, and fault current levels may be drastically lower during islanding.  For this 
reason, and for the simplification of other issues mentioned here, intentional islanding 
tends to be more feasible for areas where DG is found at the end of a radial feeder than 
when it is found on low voltage networks. 
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IX.  CASE STUDY – CAL POLY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
 The design case study presented here is implemented on the distribution system 
of California Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo, CA (Cal Poly).  The single-
line diagram of the existing distribution system is shown in Figure IX.1.  The objective of 
this case study is to design an upgraded system that would make Cal Poly’s system a 
near net-zero consumer – that is a facility that has nearly 100% of its energy demand 
provided locally and imports zero energy on an average.  The generation methods used 
to achieve this goal should use only renewable fuel sources to reduce or eliminate fuel 
costs, to support research and development in the field of renewable energies, and to 
foster environmental responsibility within the campus and community.  The underlying 
purpose of this case study is to illustrate how the issues discussed in this paper should 
be addressed during design so that the system functionality is optimized and problematic 
scenarios are avoided. 
 Multiple justifications for implementing such a design at Cal Poly exist.  Firstly, a 
large institution such as Cal Poly has energy bills so large that investments in generation 
capabilities can be economically justified rather easily.  Furthermore, the primary 
objective of Cal Poly is education; design and implementation of emerging technologies, 
such as those of renewable energies, provides resources for application-based 
education in various fields.  The power delivery system of Cal Poly maintains the 
facilities necessary to run the institution, but it can also serve as a real-world scenario for 
students to research and develop.  The city of San Luis Obispo has high solar insolation 
levels, consistent wind stream areas, and a close proximity to coastal regions.  Cal Poly 
has access to large portions of open land in these local areas, making the school an 
ideal candidate for implementing renewable energy methods.  With a design focused on 
renewable energy that addresses all areas of concern discussed in this paper, the local 
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utility Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) also stands to benefit a great deal from such a 
project since it would credit their renewable portfolio requirements.  With all parties 
involved in a position to benefit, implementation should be easily accomplished if a 
design is achieved that ensures safe and reliable service. 
 The existent system shown in Figure IX.1 was modeled using ETAP software.  
The system loading was derived from metering data gathered by Cal Poly’s facilities 
department; yearly loading data is shown in Appendix A.  The loading data presented is 
incomplete and contains some incongruencies due to abnormal operation.  However, the 
loading data was used to gain only approximate typical loading; the simulations were 
performed to account for light and heavy loads that entailed the full range of possible 
loading.  In this high-level model, the various loads on each feeder are modeled as a 
single lumped load; further detail of one feeder is also shown for brevity.  Main protection 
for the system feeders is shown in the figure; the Upper Substation feeders are 
protected differentially, while the Middle and Lower Substation feeders are protected by 
overcurrent relays.  The protection devices downstream of those shown are primarily 
fuses; some feeders may have hundreds of fuses with various trip settings downstream 
of the main breakers.  The ratings and impedance values of the equipment shown in 
Figure IX.1 are tabulated in Appendix B.  Load flows for the system are presented in 
Table IX.A for various loading and various output levels of the existent DG on the 
system.  The values given are the kW of load flow in the downstream direction for each 
branch of the system listed (negative values indicate upstream flow). 
 
Figure IX.1  Nominal High-Level System of Cal Poly Distribution Network
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Table IX.A  System Branch Load Flows (in kW) at Various Loading & Generation Levels
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Table IX.B  Feeder Interties
 The system shown in Figure IX.1 is a strictly radially fed system, and normal 
operation of the system is as shown.  However, most of the feeders have a possible 
intertie (not shown) with at least one other feeder through a 
switch that is normally open.  These interties can be used to 
maintain service to a feeder that is otherwise out of service, 
but the interties also allow for the system to be operated in 
a looped fashion.  For example, feeders D and G can be 
intertied to establish the “dorm loop” (the loads on these 
feeders are dormitories), which would also create a tie 
between the two buses of the Lower Substation.  This 
also allows the Sierra Co-Generation Plant to feed directly to both feeders.  The possible 
interies between feeders are not shown in the figure, but they are presented in Table 
IX.B for reference. 
Feeders Intertie Device 
Z W S201 
Z V S061 
W V 
S124 
S019 
T S S171 
G D S106 
E B T170 
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 Prior to completing an analysis of the system for investigating DG potential, the 
following observations of the nominal system were made: 
• Approximately 80% of the real power loading is on feeders V, W, and Z off the 
Upper Substation.  This portion of the system is operating near capacity, while 
the Middle and Lower Substations have plenty of room for further growth. 
• Feeders W and V run through the densest portions of the campus and are, 
therefore, poorly suited for interconnection with greenfield developments.  
Feeders Z and C run through remote areas of the campus where there is much 
potential for greenfield projects. 
• The Middle Substation currently has four spare feeders, making this bus the most 
likely candidate for future developments.  Two of the spare feeders have been 
designated for future load growth accommodation, while one has been 
designated for future co-generation development. 
• Under normal operating conditions, the Main1 Transformer feeding the Upper 
Substation bus is significantly more heavily loaded than the Main2 Transformer 
feeding the Middle Substation bus.  While the load on Main1 is still well within its 
ratings, closing the tie between the Upper and Middle Substations would balance 
the transformer loadings and may improve voltage regulation. 
• Feeder V currently has four generators intertied with it – not enough to supply the 
full V feeder load, but additional generation on this feeder may pose coordination 
difficulties. 
• Existent generation capabilities on Feeders A and G exceed the load demand on 
those feeders; therefore, if these generators run at full capacity they also supply 
power to adjacent feeders and the power flow is reversed. 
 
Design Analysis 
 Simulations were performed on the system using ETAP software to investigate 
the parameters that would influence the various issues previously discussed in this 
paper.  Unless otherwise stated, these simulations were performed with the loads at the 
nominal values shown in Figure IX.1 and all existent generation running at 90% capacity. 
 
Power Flow 
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Table IX.C  Possible Bus Generation Capacities 
without Power Flow Reversal 
 Any additional DG added to this system must not exceed the rated capacities or 
reverse power flows between substations, or the costs and difficulties of such a project 
may become too great.  A load flow analysis was performed for the system at nominal 
loading, light loading (50% of nominal), and heavy loading (150% of nominal).  The data 
in Table IX.C shows the generation 
capacity (in kW) that could potentially 
be added to each bus without 
reversing the power flow to an 
upstream bus.  If the power flow is not 
reversed, this will also guarantee that 
current ratings are not exceeded.  
Reversal of power flow, however, 
would not necessarily be detrimental 
in each case.  For example, with the 
existent Sierra Co-Gen plant running 
at full capacity, the power flow on 
Feeder G is already reversed and 
this power can supply Feeders E and C, or it can supply Feeder D if the intertie switch 
Bus 
Generation Potential [kW] 
50% Load  Full Load  150% Load 
Upper  571  2624  4662 
Middle  176  724  1271 
Lower (N)  42  145  248 
Lower (O)  0  9  170 
Z  201  401  599 
W  903  1799  2688 
V  0  424  1376 
T  142  285  427 
S  142  285  427 
G  0  0  0 
E  72  144  215 
D  72  144  215 
C  2  4  6 
B  14  27  41 
A  0  0  0 
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between D and G is closed.  In most cases, power flow reversal from a feeder to the 
substation bus should not be a problem – the power can then supply adjacent feeders 
on that same bus.  This will, however, require that protection scheme settings be 
reappraised to ensure that there will be no nuisance tripping. 
 
Protection Schemes 
 The substation bus and feeder protections for the system are shown in Figure 
IX.1, but there are many more protective devices downstream on the feeder buses.  
These devices are almost entirely fused switches.  The main feeder circuit breakers are 
not likely to be problematic for modest generation growth on the feeders because they 
can accommodate generation levels up to at least the load demand of the feeder, though 
settings may need to be altered.  The downstream fuses, however, would place much 
higher restrictions on the amount of generation that could be added without upgrading 
the protection if the generation was implemented downstream of one or more of these 
fuses. 
 Figure IX.2 shows the feeder bus for Feeder Z with the protective devices for the 
various load branches, and the tripping current of each fuse is given.  Generation 
capabilities that could service a large portion of the total Feeder Z load or more would 
not be practical to implement downstream of one of the individual load branch 
transformers.  These transformers and the protection schemes have been sized to 
accommodate just that particular load branch.  However, generation tied directly to the Z 
Bus could service the entire feeder loads without disrupting the fuse protection scheme.  
If this generation exceeded the demand of Feeder Z, though, power would flow 
upstream to the Upper Substation bus.  Yet the Upper Substation is protected 
differentially, so this should not pose a problem to the protections shown in Figure IX.1.  
The other feeders on the system present very similar situations to Feeder Z. 
Figure IX.2  Feeder Z Distribution and Fuse Protection Ratings 
 Small DG systems can be implemented downstream of the distribution fuses, but 
these systems should be sized only to service the immediately local loads.  The 
photovoltaic system on the roof of the Engineering West building is an example of an 
existent implementation of such generation.  These systems can be beneficial, but it 
would take many such systems to significantly reduce the total consumption of imported 
energy to the campus. 
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 In order to quantify the effects of additional DG on the fault levels of the system, 
a short circuit analysis was performed on the system using ETAP.  Table IX.D presents 
the changes in maximum fault currents seen for faults at each bus of the system in 
Figure IX.1 due to added generation capacities.  The Upper and Middle Substation 
buses – and the feeder buses connected to them – can handle up to 300kW of additional 
generation with less than a 2% change in fault levels.  The Upper Substation bus and its 
feeder buses can handle 1MW of additional generation with less than a 5% change.  A 
small change in fault levels implies a more simplistic implementation of DG because 
existent coordination schemes may still handle the new system characteristics, but 
changes in the protection scheme may be necessary even for small fault level changes.  
Yet existent relays are likely to be capable of handling small fault level increases by 
adjustment of settings.  Conversely, an addition of 300kW at the Feeder A bus would 
cause a 30% increase in fault levels, and significant upgrades to the protection scheme 
would likely be needed. 
Table IX.D  Maximum Fault Currents due to Amount of Added Generation
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 In the interest of designing the system alterations to minimize the need for 
protection upgrades and changes, two specific parameters are aimed for.  Firstly, any 
additional DG implemented on the system should be upstream of the fuse protections on 
the feeder distribution branches.  As mentioned, small DG systems could be 
implemented downstream of these fuses, but the goal of this design is to significantly 
reduce the amount of imported energy and such small-scale systems provide limited 
benefit to this end.  Secondly, changes in fault current levels should be within a 2% 
margin when possible to avoid expensive protection scheme alterations.  However, this 
second parameter must be balanced with other expenses.  If this 2% margin were to 
warrant the implementation of many small DG installations over few large installations, 
the cost of implementing and maintaining the many DG units could outweigh the cost of 
the protection scheme changes needed for the few large units. 
 
Voltage Regulation 
 Voltage regulation of this system appears to present little challenge.  On the 
buses shown in Figure IX.1, there is less than 1% drop of voltage on any bus.  The 
capacitor banks on the Upper and Middle Substation buses are dispatchable for voltage 
support during load demand changes.  The voltage drop along the feeder lines must also 
be considered since these are modeled simply as a lumped load on the feeder bus in the 
system of Figure IX.1.  However, it was found that under nominal operating conditions, 
each of the feeders currently exhibit less than 0.1% voltage drops at any point along 
their lines.  Voltage drops of the feeder lines do not present need for concern. 
 To ensure acceptable power quality, the design shall limit the changes of all 
operating voltages between the existent system and the system with added DG to within 
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2%.  This constraint will allow for the disconnection and reconnection of DG units without 
causing drastic dips or spikes in voltage levels. 
 
Intermittency & Harmonics 
 This design shall avoid intermittency of the main portion of generation, but take 
advantage of it in a small portion.  The load demands on this system are, as usual, 
maximum during the day, but minimal at night.  A photovoltaic system can provide 
increased generation levels during higher demand without operator intervention.  Yet this 
benefit cannot be consistently reliable in predictable quantity.  Therefore, a storage 
system would be required for such a generator.  Any wind turbines or other intermittent 
sources would also require storage capabilities that could provide regulated output.  
Therefore, primary generation on this system shall be from a predictable source (non-
intermittent).  This will eliminate the need for an extensive storage system and provide 
regulation for the intermittencies present. 
 The high level design presented here involves minimal concern for harmonic 
contributions created.  Any inverter-based DG added to this system will be assumed to 
have inverting capabilities that keep harmonic levels within the limits presented in Table 
VII.A (IEEE 519 Std.).  As discussed in Section VII, available inverter technology makes 
this a relatively simple task to achieve if there is significant non-inverter-based 
generation present on the system as well. 
 
Islanding 
 A system design for intentional islanding capabilities on the Cal Poly campus 
would be difficult to justify, though an exciting notion.  If enough generation were 
implemented to sustain service to the campus, the school would basically function as a 
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microgrid.  A microgrid is an electric power system with local loads and generation that is 
capable of operating autonomously from local utility service.  Microgrids are a relatively 
new concept of interest, and DG proliferation has increased the relevance of their study.  
For this reason, a microgrid electric system on the Cal Poly campus – capable of 
intentional islanding – would provide a unique opportunity for power engineering 
research at the university.  However, the justification just about ends there. 
 Islanding capability could provide extremely high reliability of service at Cal Poly, 
but such high levels are not warranted for the school.  Demands for extremely high 
reliability rates (sometimes as high as 99.9999%) are generally seen from military, 
industrial, and commercial customers with large loads of expensive and sensitive 
equipment.  Power outages can have devastating effects for such customers.  A college 
university, on the other hand, has little need for reliability above what utilities already 
provide.  Small back-up generators are usually a more economical solution to protecting 
the few sensitive loads a campus might have than to obtain very high reliability for the 
entire campus.  An electric system capable of intentional islanding would simply be an 
unnecessary luxury on a college campus in most cases. 
 One way that such an extensive electric system might be justifiable would be if 
the school campus was to become a net producer of energy, and the university could 
profit from exported energy sales.  However, this would entail a plethora of additional 
difficulties that would only warrant address by a company looking to enter the energy 
market on a large scale.  Such an endeavor on an existent college campus’s system 
would be foolish at best; transition from a university to an energy production company is 
not likely to be simplistic. 
 Aside from this caveat on the lack of direct benefit from an electric system 
capable of islanding, it is the author’s contention that the notion still deserves 
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contemplation.  As discussed throughout this paper, developing a system that provides 
the campus with greater energy independence through local generation would clearly 
stand to benefit the university, its students, and possibly the local utility.  If done 
sustainably, it stands to benefit the nation and the world through reduced environmental 
impact and resource depletion.  If such a system were to be developed, the additional 
requirements necessary for islanding capabilities may not cause drastic increase in 
project costs, were they to be done in conjunction with other system upgrades. 
 The system proposed below could be implemented either with anti-islanding 
protection or with intentional islanding capabilities.  There would be differences in the 
upgrades needed, and the manner of nominal operation for the system based on 
whether or not islanding is to be avoided.  Therefore, the system is presented first under 
the assumption that islanding shall be avoided, and then the requirements for enabling 
the system to handle intentional islanding operation are addressed. 
 
Proposed Developments 
 This system shall provide energy independence and reliable electrical service to 
the Cal Poly campus through the installation of three new generators.  The three 
proposed generation units are listed below, and subsequent system alterations or 
studies needed are presented as well.  The total added generation capacity was initially 
based on an assumption of 100% system loading and 50% supply of existent generation 
capacity.  Some of the existent generators may serve as more of a back-up system 
rather than consistent generation, so full output should not be relied upon.  These 
generators serve as only a small portion of loading in most cases, so their effect is 
usually minimal.  The loading will vary significantly on a daily, as well as monthly, basis.  
Yet an assumed 100% loading should provide for the capacity needed on average.  
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Referring back to Table IX.A, this implies a needed generation capacity of more than 
4MW to meet the demands. 
• A photovoltaic panel system with 250kW of maximum output power shall be 
installed with interconnection to Feeder C.   
• Wind turbines with a combined total output of 1MW shall be installed with 
connection to Feeder Z.   
• A solar thermal plant with 4MW maximum output power shall be installed with 
interconnection directly to the Middle Substation bus through Feeder P (currently 
spare).  The solar thermal plant uses a solar collector to create a super-heated 
liquid, which can be stored and used to run a traditional steam turbine powered 
synchronous generator. 
 A single generation source could possibly be used to provide all of the necessary 
power, but three separate units are suggested here for multiple reasons.  A large solar 
thermal unit can provide consistent and predictable output due to its energy storage 
capability, and heat storage is more efficient and sustainable than electrical energy 
storage.  Therefore, the 4MW solar thermal unit will provide the base generation for the 
campus.  The photovoltaic and wind generation is more unpredictable and intermittent; 
they can be thought of as auxiliary sources.  Their presence will reduce transmission 
losses and provide voltage support.  The photovoltaic system will only produce energy 
during the day so it adds the benefit of naturally increased campus generation during 
higher load demand times.  Furthermore, the diversity of generation methods provides 
more opportunities for research and education at the university. 
 The Feeder C line runs northeast from the main campus into Poly Canyon, where 
there are isolated, undeveloped areas well-suited for a sizable photovoltaic system.  
There is very little load demand on Feeder C (usually less than 5kVA), so significant 
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generation capacity – like that suggested – would back-feed to the Lower Substation.  If 
this photovoltaic system outputs near maximum power with the Sierra Co-Generator on 
Feeder G also running, Transformer O would be back-fed (power flowing upstream from 
the Lower Sub to the Middle Sub).  This would be non-ideal system operation; Bus O of 
the Lower Sub would be feeding the Middle Sub, while the Middle Sub would be feeding 
Bus N of the Lower Sub.  Instead, the intertie between Feeders G and D could be 
closed, forming the “dorm loop”.  The looped operation would provide more efficient use 
of the Sierra plant since it would be servicing loads on the dorm feeders more directly, 
and the power flow through the two transformers/feeders connecting the Middle and 
Lower Substations would be better balanced. 
 Feeder Z provides power to isolated loads throughout the northwest portion of 
the campus as far as Cheda Ranch and Stenner Creek Ranch.  There is an available 
interconnect to this feeder (switch number S154) at the most northwestern area near 
Stenner Creek Road.  A wind farm could be installed on the hillside north of this switch 
and/or on the hill to the west of this switch near Highway 1.  This area provides a 
convenient location for wind energy development with viable access and interconnection 
in the immediate vicinity.  A 1MW wind farm would produce more than the loads of 
Feeder Z demand, but even with all the existent generation on Feeder V at maximum 
output, the Upper Substation would still need to import a significant amount of power.  
For this reason, the intertie between the Upper and Middle Substations should be 
normally closed to allow this import to come from the Middle Substation as well as from 
the utility connection. 
 The Middle Substation has a relatively light load demand, but it has direct 
connection to the utility as well as both other substations.  It also has four spare feeders 
at present.  This makes it an ideal interconnection point for a large quantity of 
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generation.  A solar thermal plant could be developed in a convenient location and new 
service lines could be run from that location to the Middle Substation bus.  With the 
intertie to the Upper Substation closed, this plant could service all system loads without 
disrupting power flows.  This will provide a stable source of generation for the bulk of the 
campus load demands. 
 The primary changes to the system that have just been outlined are shown in 
Figure IX.3.  Further changes to the system and to system operation are still necessary 
in order to add the generation capacities suggested here.  These changes are discussed 
on the following pages with respect to each issue of concern that warrants them.  
Nominal operation of the system proposed would entail full utilization of the new 
generation as well as the Engineering West Photovoltaics and the Sierra Co-Generator.  
The other existent generation on the system would be used mainly for back-up 
generation and high loading; they would otherwise be off or operating at low capacity.  
This will reduce fuel costs while maintaining reliable service. 
 
 Figure IX.3  Proposed Upgrades to Cal Poly Distribution Network 
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Analysis of Proposed System 
Power Flow 
 The campus distribution system should now be viewed more as a microgrid.  The 
system is still functioning primarily in a radial fashion with mostly downstream power flow 
(no flow changes are seen by the fuses or anything further downstream).  The only 
upstream flows seen are from feeders with generation up to the substation bus they are 
connected to, and possibly between substations.  There are no issues of overflow since 
all transformers see the same power flow and the new currents are well within the 
ratings for the lines, buses, and breakers affected.  While there is no pertinently 
problematic power flow during nominal operation, the load flows of the new system are 
more complex and dynamic.  All possible situations must be considered. 
 Abnormal operating conditions could cause dangerous power flow reversals.  For 
example, if Feeder E were to disconnect during nominal operation and all generators 
maintained the same outputs, power would flow from the Lower Substation to the Middle 
Substation, from the Middle Substation to the Upper Substation, and from both the 
Middle and Upper Substations to the utility.  Power flow upstream to the utility may be 
problematic since it may have adverse effects on the utility protection schemes.  All 
affected protection schemes must account for such scenarios. 
 
Voltage Regulation 
 The upgraded system shows slight improvements in voltage regulation with the 
lowest voltage on the system during nominal operation being above 99.5%.  Yet the 
changes in voltage levels compared to the existent system are minor – the greatest 
change in voltage levels occurs on the Lower Substation bus with an increase of 0.36% 
from the existent system to the proposed system.  With the changes of voltage levels 
observed being so small, connection and disconnection of generators will not produce 
problematic spikes or droops in voltage. 
 
Protection Schemes 
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Table IX.E  Source Currents (in A) for New System
 The generation added in the proposed system was intentionally implemented to 
minimize the disturbances to existent protection schemes.  Since the added generation 
is upstream of all fuse protection, the existent fuse coordination need not be altered.  
However, the potential changes in power flow that were mentioned must be addressed.  
In addition to standard internal fault protection for the generators, basic overcurrent 
protection should protect against external faults.  Table IX.E shows the nominal 
operating currents for the relevant 
sources as well as minimum and 
maximum fault currents for external 
faults.  Note that the nominal 
operating current for the utility 
connection is only 3.7A; this value would increase to nearly 30A if all on-site generation 
were out of service.  For external fault protection, time-inverse overcurrent relays on 
each generator should be set to operate for 2-3 times the maximum operating current.  
This will account for heavy loading and transient spikes seen by the generator while still 
providing back-up protection in case a generator were feeding an uncleared fault. 
 The existent overcurrent protection for the feeders on the Lower Substation bus 
should still be valid.  Nominal currents on these feeders are on the order of 30A or 
below, whereas minimum fault currents on these feeders are on the order of nearly 
1000A to 6000A.  However, nuisance tripping could occur due to fault contributions of 
generators downstream of this protection.  For example, a fault on the bus of Feeder A 
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will cause nearly 1000A to flow through Feeder A, half coming from Feeder D (Sierra 
Co-Gen and Poly Cyn PV sources) and half coming from Feeder N (Middle Substation 
source).  The desired response is for the breaker on Feeder A to open, but not any 
others.  Therefore, the overcurrent relays on Feeders D and N should not operate for 
this fault current.  To protect against nuisance tripping, the overcurrent protection of the 
feeders should be set to operate first for the minimum possible fault current seen for 
faults within their zone of protection, and set to operate with a greater time delay for fault 
currents seen for faults outside their zone (in order to provide ample back-up protection). 
 Table IX.F shows the nominal operating currents and fault currents for the 
feeders; the values in red depict upstream currents.  The table also shows the relay 
settings that will provide feeder protection, as well as redundant protection for faults 
outside the immediate zone of protection.  Most feeders can be protected with inverse-
time overcurrent relays (51), but directional overcurrent relays (67) are needed to protect 
the interties between substations and some feeders with DG since bi-directional current 
flows occur on these lines.  The 51 relay protections can most likely be covered by 
existent protection, but relay setting adjustments may be necessary.  Note that all 
upstream flow protection is protected using 67 relays, as well as the downstream 
protection on the substation interties. 
 The relay settings shown here account for all possible system power flows 
including “n-1 contingencies” for operation during the loss of a generator, a load, or a 
branch/interconnection.  These settings will provide complete fault protection (plus 
redundant protection outside primary zones), while allowing for operational power flows 
of all possible generation conditions from no onsite generation to full on-site generation.  
Individual loads on this system are still served radially, and the existent fuse protection 
remains valid.  The substation interconnections and feeder buses, however, now 
function with bi-directional flow as with high voltage systems.  Differential protection of 
the buses and transformers is still the optimal protection in those cases.  Directional 
relays will provide the additional protection needed. 
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* directional units (67) necessary for these downstream flow protections 
HVS = high voltage side of transformer ; LVS = low voltage side of transformer
Table IX.F  System Currents and Necessary Relay Settings for Protection
 
 
 The amount of alteration needed for the proposed system appears acceptable 
since only the directional relays discussed constitute significant protection equipment 
upgrades; the existent system protection will suffice for the majority of system fault 
protection.  However, two areas of protection have not yet been addressed here: 
islanding protection and the two interconnections with utility service.  Islanding protection 
issues are discussed later.  For the grid interconnection feeders, existent overcurrent 
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protection will surely be adequate since fault levels (in both directions) here are on the 
order of 10-100 times greater than any reasonable operational current levels; unless 
there is an export of more than 1MW, the current through these transformers is less than 
one tenth of the fault currents.  Yet PG&E’s protection schemes on the utility grid may be 
adversely affected by the changes to the Cal Poly system – namely the possibility of a 
net export of power from the campus at any given time.  An investigation of the upstream 
protection schemes should be performed prior to implementing this system.  Yet since 
Cal Poly is connected to the grid via a 70kV line tap on a PG&E line interconnecting 
other large substations, this line is most likely already equipped for bi-directional power 
flow and existent protection schemes are not likely to need significant upgrades. 
 If an annual average energy consumption of zero is desired, the system will have 
to be able to export power.  Consistently matching the varying load demands exactly 
with the on-site generation would be an over-zealous task – hence the need to maintain 
grid interconnection.  Therefore, a net zero consumption will be reached through an 
annual average by over-producing (exporting) power during light loading and under-
producing (importing) power during heavy loading.  Adequate protection that accounts 
for the exportation of power from the campus is necessary to reach this goal.  However, 
the alternative is to merely reduce the nominal output of on-site generation and 
implement protection that will disconnect generators when total power imported 
approaches zero.  The Cal Poly campus would still be a net consumer of energy, but the 
consumption would be drastically reduced and most benefits would still be realized, even 
if only to a lesser degree. 
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Intermittency 
 The intermittency of the wind and photovoltaic generation should not pose any 
problems to system functionality.  In fact, only minimal energy storage capacity will be 
needed for these generators.  Since the solar thermal plant and utility service are 
capable of providing power for full load demand, these intermittent sources serve mainly 
as a means to reduce the amount of imported power (or increased the amount of 
exported power) when weather conditions are ample.  Of course, some storage will be 
necessary to ensure proper operation of the inverters.  Energy storage that can sustain 
full-load output for one or two hours with no charging should be adequate for both 
systems – this would be around 50-100Amp-hours of storage in both cases.  Further 
storage may be warranted if the system is to be capable of operating in islanded mode, 
but these generators may otherwise only output when wind or sun are readily available.  
The campus will need to be capable of providing consistent and reliable power in the 
case of islanding, and greater storage capacity on these generation sources will make 
that possible.  The existent on-site generators provide additional support in this case, 
though, so the need for storage is still limited.  In the case of the PV system, output 
tends to be higher during heavy loading times (day time); the loss of this generation at 
night actually reduces the need for variation of the solar thermal output.  In this way, the 
initial and maintenance costs of battery banks (or other storage means) are marginalized 
here, while the benefits of these renewable sources are still obtainable. 
 
Harmonics 
 As mentioned previously, modern inverter technology has made management of 
harmonic injections easily realized.  Since the bulk of on-site generated power comes 
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from a synchronous generator (solar thermal), the harmonic content on the system 
should fall well within standard limits even if only modestly advanced inverters are used. 
 
Islanding 
 If islanding is to be avoided, loss of grid (LOG) detection will be necessary to 
disconnect generators when the utility connection becomes faulted.  Since on-site 
generation is capable of matching on-site load demands without utility connection, most 
detection methods could fail.  Active methods could be implemented for the photovoltaic 
and wind generation since they have inverter interconnection, but those detection 
methods would fail (though perhaps only temporarily) if the solar thermal plant were able 
to sufficiently maintain voltage and frequency.  The inherent non-detection zones of all 
passive methods would make LOG detection at the point of solar thermal 
interconnection unreliable.  Intertripping methods coordinated with utility protection 
equipment could prove to be very complicated and expensive since the utility breakers 
that could cause an LOG occurrence may be numerous and quite distant from the Cal 
Poly campus. 
 Since LOG detection cannot be simply or reliably implemented at the point of DG 
interconnection, the most sensible option is to implement it elsewhere.  Any true LOG 
occurrence could be quickly and easily detected at the point of grid interconnection – the 
high voltage sides of the two main transformers.  An LOG occurrence for the Cal Poly 
campus is electrically equivalent to a fault immediately upstream of both main 
transformers (only one connection with the grid is necessary for the proposed system to 
operate adequately).  Therefore, the most reliable method of LOG protection could be 
accomplished with under/over voltage and frequency relays on the 70kV bus that would 
trip all generator connection through high-speed communication links.  This will provide 
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quick and reliable detection for all true LOG occurrences, but further protection should 
be implemented as well. 
 Without an actual fault on the utility grid, some portion of the Cal Poly distribution 
system may experience an LOG occurrence.  That is, fault detection tripping may isolate 
one or more of the generators from any grid connection while still leaving them 
connected to loads.  For this reason, LOG detection must still be implemented at the 
point of each DG connection.  A rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) relay and/or other 
passive methods can be used to protect the solar thermal plant.  Over/under frequency 
or voltage relays could be used, but ROCOF relay have shown to be more reliable since 
their non-detection zones are smaller for the same sensitivity levels [9].  The sensitivity 
can be relaxed enough to allow for typical operational fluctuations because the primary 
protection will still prevent the feeding of faults under true LOG occurrences.  Likewise, 
the other generators can also be protected passively against faults that isolate them 
from the grid. 
 Islanding protection for this system is somewhat complicated because the 
system is capable of providing a viable island – generation capacities are able to meet 
load demands.  Because of this, intentional islanding during loss of utility service could 
be accomplished by this system.  The solar thermal plant has a large capacity and well 
regulated output; it could therefore serve as the “swing” generator during islanding.  
While connected to the grid, the generators can operate in droop mode or in power 
control mode.  These modes are dependent on the grid for maintaining constant system 
frequency, while output power is dictated by energy input, load demand, or operator 
settings.  Yet upon the occurrence of islanding, the solar thermal plant would need to be 
immediately switched to isochronous mode to maintain a system frequency of 60Hz.  
Without grid connection, the frequency and voltage of the Cal Poly island could quickly 
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collapse if the DG units were all in droop or power control mode.  Yet in the isochronous 
mode, a generator operates at a fixed frequency (fixed speed) regardless of loading.  
Only one generator on an island may operate in isochronous mode or the resulting fight 
between generators to maintain slightly different frequencies would result in system 
collapse.  Sensibly, the largest generator of an island should be the isochronous 
generator – this is the solar thermal plant here.  Methods for instantaneous switching 
between droop mode and isochronous mode upon islanding occurrences may be difficult 
to realize because current regulations prohibit islanding operation in almost all cases.  
This may be the biggest hindrance in implementing intentional islanding operation on 
this system.  Nonetheless, much literature speculates about this method of intentional 
islanding soon being realized for the sake of reducing outage costs for highly sensitive 
utility customers.  [9,27,28,29] 
 For intentional islanding operation, the same LOG detection on the 70kV bus 
previously mentioned could still be used.  Instead of a LOG detection signal being used 
to disconnect the generators, however, in this case it would be used to switch the solar 
thermal plant into isochronous mode.  The LOG signal would have to instantaneously 
activate autonomous switching of the solar thermal plant into isochronous mode.  
Another change to the proposed system necessary to implement intentional islanding is 
that all the generators on the V Bus should be running during nominal operation.  They 
need not produce significant output during nominal operation, but they must be available 
to do so for load support in the event of islanding when the renewable sources are not 
adequate to meet current demand.  The switching to island mode must happen 
instantaneously upon LOG, so the other generators must already be running since the 
solar thermal plant may not be capable of supporting the system during their start-up 
times. 
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System Summary 
? Solar Thermal Plant 
• Solar collectors for superheating fluid; heat storage of fluid; synchronous 
machine powered by steam turbines for regulated output 
• 4MW (191A) capacity; around 3.5MW (169A) nominal operation 
• Connected to Middle Substation via spare Feeder P 
• Passive LOG protection in addition to standard generator protection 
• Nominally operated in droop mode; isochronous mode for intentional islanding 
? Poly Canyon Photovoltaics 
• 250kW (41A) maximum output capacity 
• Connected to Feeder C in Poly Canyon 
• Passive LOG detection in addition to standard generator protection 
• Low harmonic content inverter 
• deep cycle battery storage of 50-100A/hr 
? Stenner Creek Wind Farm 
• 1MW (55A) maximum output capacity 
• Connected to Feeder Z near Cheda & Stenner Creek Ranches 
• Passive LOG detection in addition to standard generator protection 
• Low harmonic content inverter 
• deep cycle battery storage of 50-100A/hr (possibly more for islanding capability) 
? System Protection 
• Time-Inverse Overcurrent (51) relays on all load feeders 
• Directional Overcurrent (67) relays on interties and Feeders Z, V, & G 
• Feeder relay settings shown in Table IX.E 
• LOG detection at DG interconnection as well as grid interconnection 
? Interties 
• Upper Sub – Middle Sub intertie nominally closed 
• Feeder G – Feeder D intertie nominally closed (dorm loop) 
• System power flows are more complex (bi-directional); care must be taken to 
ensure safety during maintenance switching 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 The nature of power grids is inevitably changing, evidenced by the steady 
increase of distributed generation installations on grids worldwide.  The issues discussed 
in this paper are natural hindrances to the reliable operation of grids that experience high 
levels of DG growth, but they are not insurmountable.  The benefits that DG provides to 
customers and utility and the increasing need for renewable energy sources have 
proven to outweigh the difficulties encountered in their implementation.  In many cases, 
DG offers a means to improve grid operation through voltage support, decreased 
transmission losses, and increased reliability.  The issues presented in this paper, 
though, demand consideration before the installation of any distributed generator.  
Electrical standards are direly needed in this field, as each DG development is currently 
addressed on merely a case-by-case basis.  If grids – or portion of grids – are evaluated 
on a more complete scale, the use of DG may be more ideally optimized instead of 
developing in a “patchwork” fashion.  It is likely that DG will provide much higher portions 
of total energy production on the future grids and the challenge for engineers then, is to 
mitigate the adverse effects so that the benefits may be fully realized. 
 The case study of Cal Poly’s distribution system presented in this paper is an 
example of what may become a commonplace endeavor.  As the cost of conventional 
electrical energy continues to rise and the cost of modern DG technologies continues to 
decrease, large facilities like college campuses and industrial complexes will experience 
greater incentives to produce energy independently.  The formation of microgrids in such 
instances, as well as within utilities’ own grid systems, is a concept piquing much 
interest.  The paradigm of future grids may look significantly different than the traditional 
paradigm, but the fundamental principles needed to operate current grids are the same 
principles that any new paradigm will need to maintain for successful operation. 
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Future Studies 
 Most sections of this paper could easily warrant an entire thesis on their own.  
This paper presents a high level overview of the various issues surrounding DG, but in-
depth investigations into each issue would prove beneficial as engineers strive to keep 
up with evolving changes in power distribution systems.  The case study presented here 
provides a basis from which many research projects could begin.  Foremost, more 
extensive data collection would provide the ability to refine and expand the usefulness of 
this study.  Presented below are a few areas in which future research could help make 
the proposed system for Cal Poly’s net zero consumption a reality.  With the research of 
this paper primarily focused on the effects of DG on grids in general, the data collected 
on Cal Poly’s system and resource availability was limited.  Data acquisition in this area 
would be most immediately beneficial to the progression of such a system. 
 
Cost Analysis 
 Before the changes suggested for Cal Poly’s distribution system could be 
implemented, such changes must be proven economically justifiable.  An extensive cost 
analysis would be needed to this end.  The cost of installing the new generation, 
upgrading the protection systems, as well as any additional operating and maintenance 
costs should be identified.  Current rates and costs, along with future projections, of Cal 
Poly expenses for imported energy must also be quantified.  With this information, one 
should be able to project the timeframe in which the upgraded system costs would be 
recouped.  In such a study, one may also choose to address potential cost mitigations 
through the implementation of student research programs that would provide preliminary 
engineering design or operational engineering. 
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Optimized Operations 
 With more extensive data collection on the existent generators as well as those 
to be added, one may be able to better identify optimal operating conditions.  More 
accurate loading data would also be beneficial to this end, along with meteorological 
data that could give insight into wind and solar generation expectations.  With more 
accurate load projections – daily and yearly – and expected availability of renewable 
generation, nominal operating conditions could be more accurately identified. 
 
Environmental & T&D Benefits 
 The benefits the proposed system would offer are certainly not limited to the 
curtailment of energy bills for Cal Poly.  With identification of annual energy production 
through the renewable sources used, one could perform a study to quantify the 
environmental benefits gained.  This system will reduce the consumption of fuel supplies 
that would otherwise be needed to provide campus electricity; an analysis of the 
resource depletion and harmful emissions/waste avoided could prove quite significant.  
Likewise, a reduction of imported power would inevitably reduce the power losses seen 
by the utility that would come from the otherwise transmitted power.  Quantifications of 
such benefits could well supplement other studies such as the cost analysis suggested. 
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APPENDIX A – CAL POLY YEARLY METERING DATA, 2008-2009 
 
 The following graphs show metering data collected by the Cal Poly Facilities 
department from July 2008 through June 2009.  Data for the S and T feeders that 
service Poly Canyon Village from the Middle Substation were not operational during this 
timeframe, so data for those feeders is not presented here.  Some incongruencies exist 
on these graphs due to abnormal operations; zero value points were omitted in the 
calculations of average, maximum, and minimum load demands. 
 
 
 
Average: ( 4.118 + j0.948 ) MVA Average: ( 727.6 + j157.8 ) kVA 
Peak: ( 5.239 + j1.335 ) MVA Peak: ( 1295.0 + j383.0 ) kVA 
Minimum: ( 3.268 + j0.532 ) MVA Minimum: ( 230.8 + j0.0 ) kVA 
 
 
 
Average: ( 1.778 + j1.192 ) MVA Average: ( 401.0 + j262.3 ) kVA 
Peak: ( 2.091 + j1.306 ) MVA Peak: ( 453.8 + j282.9 ) kVA 
Minimum: ( 1.446 + j1.074 ) MVA Minimum: ( 352.8 + j226.4 ) kVA 
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Average: ( 35.32 + j9.27 ) kVA Average: ( 27.08 + j15.89 ) kVA 
Peak: ( 43.89 + j11.48 ) kVA Peak: ( 55.46 + j22.68 ) kVA 
Minimum: ( 30.25 + j7.71 ) kVA Minimum: ( 10.56 + j6.43 ) kVA 
 
 
Average: ( 143.63 + j36.49 ) kVA Average: ( 143.63 + j36.49 ) kVA 
Peak: ( 183.55 + j47.50 ) kVA Peak: ( 183.55 + j47.50 ) kVA 
Minimum: ( 78.17 + j21.58 ) kVA Minimum: ( 78.17 + j21.58 ) kVA 
 
 
 
Average: ( 174.88 + j65.20 ) kVA Average: ( 3.77 + j3.00 ) kVA 
Peak: ( 425.19 + j170.41 ) kVA Peak: ( 5.14 + j3.49 ) kVA 
Minimum: ( 6.75 + j12.06 ) kVA Minimum: ( 2.44 + j2.12 ) kVA 
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Average: ( 324.7 + j170.8 ) kVA Average: ( 3.77 + j3.00 ) kVA 
Peak: ( 625.7 + j281.0 ) kVA Peak: ( 5.14 + j3.49 ) kVA 
Minimum: ( 99.3 + j101.7 ) kVA Minimum: ( 2.44 + j2.12 ) kVA 
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APPENDIX B – CONDUCTOR & TRANSFORMER MODELING DATA 
 
Cable Size Length [ft] Quantity per phase 
Resistance 
[Ω/1000ft]* 
Reactance 
[Ω/1000ft]*
CBL-39 500 50 2 0.02840 0.0351 
CBL-40 750 100 2 0.02030 0.0332 
CBL-45 350 30 1 0.03750 0.0375 
CBL-46 350 30 1 0.03750 0.0375 
CBL-48 1250 30 1 0.01812 0.0710 
CBL-53 1250 30 1 0.01812 0.0710 
CBL-55 350 500 1 0.04387 0.0830 
CBL-58 750 40 2 0.02030 0.0332 
CBL-68 500 3 1 0.02760 0.0311 
CBL-72 4/0 50 1 0.06330 0.0332 
CBL-Sierra 2 200 1 0.19934 0.1040 
 *Impedance values given are in ohms per 1000 feet per conductor 
 
Transformer MVA rating 
%Z 
impedance X/R ratio 
A 0.300 4.40 4.70 
CS 1.000 5.82 5.79 
Din 0.500 6.05 5.10 
Main1 10.000 8.79 15.50 
Main2 10.000 8.79 15.50 
N 3.750 5.73 11.41 
O 3.750 5.54 11.41 
PAC AA 1.000 5.62 5.79 
PV 0.500 5.20 5.10 
Sierra 0.500 4.59 4.70 
 
